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Public diplomacy
 helped win the Cold War, 
and it has the potential 
to help win the war on terror.
 (Djerejian 2003, 13)
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Why do they hate us?” President George W. Bush’s question in his address to the Congress 
on 20 September 2001 reflected the broad post-9/11 discourse of shock and incomprehension. 
Accompanied by a reinvigoration of public diplomacy to counter the hostility against the US, 
particularly in Arab and Muslim countries, the phrase has in international media become a 
symbol of American ignorance. Critical proclamations such as the ironic suggestion that “it’s 
not the policy that’s the problem, it’s just that we’re misunderstood” have branded public di-
plomacy as an arrogant strategy for manipulating foreign audiences. 
Out in the field and behind the desks of the US State Department (SD), public diplo-
mats face a different reality. Throughout the world, and particularly in Muslim countries, the 
US’ image is deteriorating. The declining popularity of the US abroad, particularly following 
the war on terrorism, causes considerable concern about American soft power in general and 
security in particular. In public diplomacy circles, there is a belief that public diplomacy has 
the potential to help win the war on terrorism, by reaching out to people who potentially could 
be influenced by, and inclined to fund, terrorists. However, frustration is breeding among SD 
public diplomats who feel that their work is being counteracted by another enemy: The US 
Department of Defense. 
 Because the war on terrorism has caused a major concern about ‘hearts and minds’, 
the Department of Defense (DoD) has become increasingly involved in the issue. This has led 
to a bureaucratic struggle between the SD and the DoD, through which tasks have been 
shifted and practices have been changed. Public diplomacy has a long tradition from the Cold 
War, and practitioners have through various debates and practices developed strong norms 
and ideas about its purpose and target. I will in this thesis analyse how the entrance of the 
DoD as a perpetrator in this game has changed the public diplomacy discourse since 9/11, in a 
geopolitical perspective. 
The geographical dimensions of public diplomacy are a rather unexplored field in aca-
demia, although the practice is fundamentally geopolitical. It represents a tool for influencing 
strategic audiences in foreign audiences to counter a perceived geopolitical threat. In this the-
sis, I will analyse how the representation of the geopolitical threat direct different approaches 
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to public diplomacy, and how this practice has developed since the early days of the war on 
terrorism.  
1.1 Research Question 
The main research question of this thesis is “what is the geopolitical rationale of American 
public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era?” A ‘geopolitical rationale’ is a theoretical con-
cept that refers to spatial-political networks of power embedded in reasoning and practices. 
Implicitly, this means that the thesis adopts a constructivist perspective, which sees the world 
as made up of socially constructed phenomena. The analytical strategy employed is a dis-
course analysis with emphasis on the impact of competing discourses on each other and their 
underlying geopolitical premises. 
To explain the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy, I have differentiated the 
concept into three interconnected aspects. The first aspect concerns the display of geopolitical 
representations in public diplomacy activities. As a means of strategic communication, public 
diplomacy addresses potential threats to and opportunities for the US. Messages developed in 
this discourse, such as different representations of anti-Americanism, give insight in percep-
tions of geopolitical power structures embedded in the public diplomacy culture. The second 
aspect relates to how these representations are manifested in public diplomacy efforts. As the 
analysis will show, different approaches, often advocated by different institutions, are en-
gaged in a discursive struggle about the rationale of public diplomacy. Much of the confusion 
and contradictory practices of public diplomacy can be attributed to the fact that diverging 
geopolitical representations guide the different approaches. This also relates to the third as-
pect, which is the output of the discursive struggle, or how these discourses affect each other 
and the development of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era. Because the research 
questions are closely linked to the analytical approach and theoretical framework, they will be 
further explained and operationalised in chapter three and four.  
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
The next chapter outlines the context in which the notions, debates and practices discussed in 
this thesis have emerged. Some of the central concepts of the thesis are highly ambiguous, 
including core notions such as ‘public diplomacy’ and the ‘war on terrorism’. The notion of 
‘public diplomacy’ will be addressed through an outline of the variety of approaches to what 
public diplomacy is, how it relates to other kinds of strategic communication, and who the 
involved actors are. The ambiguities of the concept and practice of the ‘war on terrorism’ will 
also be dealt with here. Finally, the power structure in which public diplomacy is embedded in 
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the war on terrorism will be addressed, and what kind of power resource the practice consti-
tutes. 
 Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis, which comprises two 
compound sets of discourse theory and geopolitical theory. The discourse theory and the geo-
political framework respectively constitute two levels of the analytical strategy: the strategy 
employed to find meaning and the specific kind of meaning that will be analysed. In the end 
of the chapter, the research question is theoretically operationalised. 
Chapter four discusses the philosophical assumptions and analytical strategy of the 
thesis. A particular concern is how the choices of theories, analytical strategies, research ques-
tions and empirical data have affected the direction of the research process and hence the find-
ings and conclusions. The chapter also deals with the motivation and analytical demarcation 
of the research question.  
Chapter five, six and seven constitute the analysis and answer to the research question. 
In Chapter five, the debates and practices through which public diplomacy has developed in 
the war on terrorism era are analysed. The chapter starts with how different approaches to 
public diplomacy construe the geopolitical threat anti-Americanism, and discusses how this 
premise forms the guidelines for different institutions to engage in public diplomacy. These 
guidelines, or “rules”, concern what methods and messages are considered appropriate for 
countering the geopolitical threat. The chapter further analyses the impact the diverging dis-
courses have on each other and on the general practice and development of public diplomacy. 
Chapter six analyses a case, the public diplomacy advertising campaign Shared Values 
Initiative (SVI) from 2002. The campaign was an initiative of the State Department to engage 
in dialogue with audiences in Muslim countries as an attempt to counter the idea that the war 
on terrorism is a war on Muslims. Central to the analysis here is how the campaign communi-
cates geopolitical visions, particularly in how it represents the relationship between Ameri-
cans and Muslims, and the campaign’s standing among public diplomats.  
Chapter seven concludes the analytical findings of the thesis. Finally, two appendices 
are attached: a list of informants and a transcription of the SVI campaign. 

2  CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first used in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. 
Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. Until then, the concept was known as ‘propaganda’1, 
for which the term public diplomacy originated as a euphemism. However, this definition is 
somewhat dated, as the current trend of public diplomacy involves much more and sensitive 
practitioners reject the use of propaganda in favour of cross-cultural learning and dialogue.  
Since the beginning of the Cold War, public diplomacy has been a central tool for promoting 
the US and American interests abroad. Following the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center 
and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11), public diplomacy has been reinvigorated as an 
integrated strategy of the war on terrorism. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the context in which the notions, debates and practices 
discussed in this thesis have emerged. A central notion is ‘public diplomacy’, whose very 
definition is a matter of substantial debate. I will discuss the variety of approaches to what 
public diplomacy is, how it relates to other kinds of strategic communication, and who the 
involved actors are. Another central notion is the ‘war on terrorism’, which involves ambigui-
ties both as a concept and in practice. Finally, I will discuss what kind of power resource pub-
lic diplomacy constitutes, and the power structure in which it is embedded in the war on ter-
rorism.  
2.1 What Is Public Diplomacy? 
Many efforts have been made to define public diplomacy, often with different ideological im-
plications and strong preferences involved. Because public diplomacy is a field of contro-
versy, questions about the concept’s definition, ethics and effectiveness have been substan-
tially debated. Different public diplomats advocate a variety of approaches as the real public 
diplomacy, distinguished from bad or quasi-public diplomacy. Because the notion tends to be 
used changeably, I will define public diplomacy broadly in this thesis, and discuss the variety 
of approaches to what public diplomacy is and what it is not.   
 While traditional diplomacy is communicated between national governments, public 
diplomacy is directed towards foreign publics. A common definition singles out the national 
                                                 
1 http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm 
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government as the perpetrator, such as that of the Dictionary of International Relations Terms: 
“Public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence 
public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cul-
tural exchanges, radio and television” (U.S. Department of State, 1987, 85). According to this 
definition, ‘public diplomacy’ labels government-sponsored activities with a certain intention. 
Other activities that can be included in this kind of definition are educational exchanges like 
the Fulbright programme; embassy press briefings; official websites in local languages; sports 
diplomacy, and to some extent international aid programmes like US Agency for International 
Development (USAID); Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED). However, many of these efforts have multifaceted intentions and are 
not specifically designed as public diplomacy.  
 According to some definitions, the role of the government is downplayed to highlight 
the increasing involvement of informal actors in activities with the same intentions and in-
struments. US Information Agency (USIA), the main coordinator of public diplomacy pro-
grams until it was abolished in 1999, used the following definition:  
 
Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the 
United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and 
broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.2 
 
This definition does not suggest any specific agent, but it is similar to the former in the sense 
that it places the emphasis on the intention.  
 It is frequently argued that the ultimate objective of public diplomacy is to improve 
the public opinion, or “move the needle” (Djerejian 2003). According to this approach, public 
diplomacy is not simply about delivering a message; it is about getting a result (Leonard 
2002). Rather than focusing on its intention, this approach emphasises the function of public 
diplomacy as a strategic and tactical tool. When focusing on its ability to improve a public 
opinion, what becomes apparent is that public diplomacy has reactive, tactical and strategic 
dimensions with different time frames and different impact.  
 Foreign policy actions and formulations have according to this approach a short-term 
impact, because it gives an immediate response. Government sponsored communications 
(such as radio, television, websites and publications) have a cumulative medium-term impact 
of creating understanding, appreciation or acceptance of American culture and foreign policy. 
                                                 
2 http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm 
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Long-term investments such as educational and cultural exchanges can have an impact over 
time: the people involved can become local “ambassadors” for the US in their respective 
countries. A prime target for Fulbright exchanges, for example, is elite students, or “future 
state leaders”, which prospectively can have an impact on their respective countries’ foreign 
policies.  
 What the influence entails, however, is not always clear, and is utterly hard to meas-
ure. A historical parallel is Cold War public diplomacy, which demonstrates the historical 
success of the concept. Throughout the Cold War, institutions such as USIA and Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) were central in executing what in the CIA was known as the “Marshall 
plan for the mind” (Saunders 2001). The success of the concept in Europe during the Cold 
War is indisputable: Public diplomacy was central for building an image of the US as a leader 
despite its (in Western Europe) disrespected “cowboy” reputation; creating the mythology of 
America, capitalism and consumerism; establishing emotional ties and loyalty to the US and 
American companies; and normalising American perspectives, archetypes and communication 
norms (Saunders 2001). Among public diplomacy people, there is a broad agreement that 
public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, both by serving as a Trojan horse in Communist 
societies and by attracting allies in Western Europe. The attraction relates to a core notion in 
the vocabulary of public diplomacy, ‘hearts and minds’. This notion describes well what the 
influence of public diplomacy entails: it relates not only to people’s opinions, but also to their 
sentiment through which opinions often are formed. In other words, the influence of public 
diplomacy is complex, often indirect and sometimes imperceptible. 
 Finally, public diplomacy is sometimes also defined through its effect, which to a less 
extent takes the perpetrator, means or strategic intention into account. A State Department of-
ficial argued that, “Everything we do has a public diplomacy component; everything we do 
has a weight in the public arena” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007). The most effective exam-
ples of public diplomacy lately, he argued, have been the prison camps Abu Ghraib and Guan-
tanamo, because they contribute to consolidating a strong image of the US abroad, albeit un-
intended and negative. When public diplomacy is defined outside of its formal or intentional 
bounds, it also becomes apparent that other transnational communication can have the desired 
public diplomacy effect: “With YouTube etc., public diplomacy has expanded beyond states, 
and is increasingly something going on from publics to publics, building relationships be-
tween people” (Snow, interview 8.3.2007).  
 The new information environment is currently a central concern for public diplomats. 
It has become increasingly difficult to control and influence media and compete for attention. 
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In this context, when regarded independently of its previous successes, public diplomacy can 
appear somewhat desperate in the war on terrorism.  However, public diplomacy has received 
increased attention in the previous years, and an increasing number of countries have started 
to engage in equivalent activities.   
 Public diplomacy is a floating term used differently by each speaker and often variably 
throughout a conversation. The different approaches to and definitions of public diplomacy 
range from focusing on its intention, through its function to the effect. These are not mutually 
excluding, but have a differing focus. Elements that are incorporated in the diverging ap-
proaches can be sorted accordingly: 
 
 
 
Perpetrator, Instruments, Strategic impact, Hearts and minds, Reputation, Cultural ties 
          
Intention   Function  Effect 
    Figure 2.1: Public diplomacy: The range of definitions 
 
As the figure shows, the elements are often overlapping, though they have a different implica-
tion for each approach. Where the intention-approach defines public diplomacy through its 
perpetrator or its means for accomplishing its purpose, the function-approach emphasizes the 
link between the intention and strategic impact. The effect-approach is less typical and in-
cludes unintended expressions in its definition of public diplomacy. In this thesis, I will define 
the concept broadly, but in accordance with the research question; I will focus only on the ra-
tionale of formal, governmental public diplomacy, and not on its effect.  
2.1.1 Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication   
Public diplomacy is often distinguished from or compared to strategic communication, public 
affairs, propaganda, psychological operations (psy-ops) and spin. These concepts can be 
structured in the following analytical subcategories, which by no means are exhaustive:  
Strategic communication 
Public affairs Public diplomacy Information Operations 
Spin 
 Propaganda Psy-ops 
 White, Grey, Black   
 Advertising, Public relations  
   Figure 2.2: Subcategories of strategic communication 
Strategic communication originated as the military counterpart to public diplomacy, but has in 
the recent years become the coordinating principle of public diplomacy, public affairs and in-
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formation operations.3 It emerged as a major focus for transformation of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) as a result of a 2004 Defense Science Board study. According to the study, 
strategic communication refers to 
 
“a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to understand global at-
titudes and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, ad-
vise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications 
of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through communications 
strategies” (Defense Science Board 2004, 11; emphasis in original).  
 
The purpose of strategic communication, according to the study, is to “help to shape context 
and build relationships that enhance the achievement of political, economic, and military ob-
jectives” (Ibid).  
 The US State Department formally distinguishes between public diplomacy and public 
affairs due to the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402), 
popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act. Public affairs refer to “the provision of infor-
mation to the public, press and other institutions concerning the goals, policies and activities 
of the US government” (Jansen 2005, 52). The target audience can thus be domestic, while 
that of public diplomacy is foreign. Moreover, the Act also prohibits domestic distribution of 
information intended for foreign audiences. The intention of the formal division between pub-
lic affairs and public diplomacy was to produce barriers against information control of na-
tional narratives, or in a more common formulation: to prohibit the government from propa-
gandizing the American public. 
 Information operation (IO) is a term used by the DoD to include Psy-ops, Computer 
Network Operations, Electronic Warfare, Operational Security and Military Deception. Psy-
ops sometimes resemble public diplomacy: it refers to “military activities that use selected 
information and indicators to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign governments, or-
ganizations, groups, and individuals in support of military and national security objectives” 
(Defense Science Board 13, 2004). A difference between psy-ops and public diplomacy is the 
formers uninhibited use of deception. 
 Spin is sometimes used in all kinds of strategic communication, and is a “coordinated 
strategy to minimize negative information and present in a favourable light a story that is 
damaging” (Jowett & O’Donnell 1999, 3). Different rules apply to the use of spin in public 
diplomacy and psy-ops, because public diplomacy usually operates within a longer time frame 
                                                 
3 The notion of strategic communication originated as a military term, but since it diffused into the corporate 
world relating to communication with a clear purpose, it has often been chiefly associated with the private sector. 
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and hence needs to build credibility. The same rules apply to the respective strategies’ use of 
propaganda.  
 Governmental propaganda is a delicate issue in many countries, including the US. 
Propaganda can be defined as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, ma-
nipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve response that furthers the desired intent of 
the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell 1999, 6). The leading propaganda scholars Jowett and 
O’Donnell further divide the concept in the subcategories white, black, and grey propaganda. 
White propaganda usually communicates accurate information, and the source is defined cor-
rectly. It attempts to “build credibility with the audience, for this could have usefulness at 
some point in the future” (Ibid, 12). Black propaganda spreads lies, fabrications and decep-
tions, and is credited to a false source. Grey propaganda is somewhere between white and 
black propaganda: “The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of 
the information is uncertain” (Ibid, 15). It is sometimes argued that public diplomacy can be 
white or grey propaganda, but never black (Romarheim 2005). However, as the initial discus-
sion indicates: this depends on the definition of public diplomacy and its purpose. Black 
propaganda is known to be undermining in the long term, but propaganda-sensitive societies 
sometimes react negatively on white and grey propaganda as well. The association with 
propaganda is regarded as a problem for public diplomacy in general, because of its connota-
tion to mind-control, deception and cultural imperialism. 
  Strategic communication, public affairs, information operations, psy-ops, spin and 
propaganda constitute the exterior against which public diplomacy often is defined. A final set 
of notions rarely associated with this conceptual package is two genres of public diplomacy: 
advertising and public relations. Although these can be seen as kinds of propaganda, they are 
often not perceived as such and hence their placement in the figure is somewhat problematic. 
The differences between advertising and public relations relate respectively to whether it is 
paid or free publicity, whether the source is known as an advertiser or goes through a third-
party source, whether it goes through the closed advertising sphere or the news media, and 
whether the message is framed for the target audience or the media. In some cases, public re-
lations campaigns open for two-ways communications, contrary to advertising, and are per-
ceived as more credible, even though the use of third party (‘deflective’) sources can be un-
derstood as grey propaganda. These two approaches have through their different advocators 
marked a shift in the public diplomacy discourse in the war on terrorism era.  
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2.1.2 Perpetrators of US Public Diplomacy  
Who the agents of public diplomacy are, is also a matter of how the concept is defined. In the 
broadest sense, anyone that, in one way or another, shapes the foreign public opinion about 
the US can be a public diplomat: American firms and tourists abroad, internationally broad-
casted television shows, etc. When such unintended public diplomacy is defined out, a num-
ber of institutions remain. The private sector performs a large amount of activities that resem-
ble public diplomacy, although the primary purpose usually is to strengthen the reputation of 
the firm rather than that of the US. Likewise, a number of governmental institutions such as 
Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, etc. are a large 
source of information abroad. However, some institutions are designated to perform public 
diplomacy tasks with the specific purpose of improving the public opinion about the US 
abroad.  
 Until 1999, the main coordinating institution of public diplomacy was the US Informa-
tion Agency (USIA). For the purpose of administrative streamlining and bringing public di-
plomacy closer to policy formulation, USIA was disbanded and its tasks split between the 
State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). While BBG became inde-
pendently responsible for all governmental and government sponsored, non-military interna-
tional broadcasting, exchange- and information programs were transferred to the SD. BBG is 
responsible for two of the most “attention-grabbing” efforts in the war on terrorism era, Radio 
Sawa (Together) from March 2002, and the satellite TV channel Al-Hurra (The Free One) 
from early 2004. These still broadcast in the Middle East. 
 In the SD, public diplomacy is headed by the Under Secretary of State for Public Di-
plomacy and Public Affairs, and the tasks split between the Bureau of Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs. A third bureau, the Bu-
reau of Public Affairs, coordinates strategic communication with bureaus throughout the SD, 
the White House, and other agencies dealing with foreign affairs, such as the Department of 
Defense (DoD). So far in the war on terrorism era, the position as Under Secretary has been 
occupied by three different persons, as visualised on the figure:  
 
 Charlotte Beers         Margaret D. Tutwiler   Karen Hughes 
 
2 October 2001– 28 March 2003,  16 December 2003–30 June 2004,  9 September 2005–31 October 2007 
Figure 2.3: Timeline of Public Diplomacy Chiefs at the SD 
 
 19
The first, Charlotte Beers, was sworn in on 2 October 2001, nine months after the inaugura-
tion of President George W. Bush. Foreign public opinion and public diplomacy were not 
high on the Bush administration’s agenda until the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center 
and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11), but the terror attacks made the US’ declining 
popularity abroad an emergency issue.  
 Beers is a former advertising executive and had worked with then Secretary of State 
Colin Powell on an earlier occasion. Although Beers’ methods were varied and incorporated 
elements from traditional public diplomacy, she became rather infamous for introducing ad-
vertising as a public diplomacy strategy. Her main project was the controversial Shared Value 
Initiative in 2002, which is undoubtedly the most debated public diplomacy effort in the war 
on terrorism era. Already in March 2003, she resigned and the position remained vacant until 
former ambassador to Morocco Margaret Tutwiler was sworn in on 16 December 2003. Tut-
wiler only lasted in the position for six months and did not seem to bring about much change 
in the State Department. After she resigned in June 2004, the position was again left vacant 
for more than a year until President Bush’s former communication advisor Karen Hughes was 
appointed as the new Under Secretary in September 2005. Hughes is a public relations expert, 
and throughout her period until she resigned in October 2007, she focused on process issues 
in the public diplomacy structure and less controversial efforts. I will analyse the approaches 
of the respective Under Secretaries Charlotte Beers and Karen Hughes in chapter 5.  
 Public diplomacy has developed as a concept through decades, and produced a dis-
course shaped by traditions, norms and debates. Because some of the current public diplomats 
are new in the game and operate outside the traditional public diplomacy sphere, these are less 
affected by this discourse. Those who partake in the discourse, are practitioners in the field 
and in the SD, critics, bloggers, members of the USIA Alumni Association, etc., and in this 
thesis, they will be referred to as the ‘public diplomacy culture’.    
 In the recent years, the DoD has emerged as a public diplomacy perpetrator, particu-
larly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, DoD established the Iraqi Media Network, which com-
prises Al Iraqiya television network, the Al Sabah newspaper, and a radio network. As previ-
ously mentioned, the Defense Science Board study of 2004 emphasised the importance of co-
ordinating public diplomacy, public affairs and open international military information. This 
study has contributed to an increased involvement of the DoD in strategic communication.  
 The DoD has also outsourced a number of public diplomacy- and other information 
activities to private communications agencies, such as the Rendon Group and the Lincoln 
Group. Rendon Group is a secretive public relations firm that has assisted a number of DoD 
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and CIA operations. Its activities include organizing the Iraqi National Congress, a PR front 
group designed to encourage the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and it was central in the fa-
mous toppling of the Hussein statue on 9 April 2003.4 The Lincoln group, formerly known as 
Iraqex, was formed to pursue private sector opportunities in Iraq. According to their website, 
the Lincoln Group “brings a unique combination of expertise in collecting and exploiting in-
formation; structuring transactions; and mitigating risks through due diligence and legal 
strategies”.5 It is hired by the DoD to perform public relations, and has become known par-
ticularly for its practice of paying local journalists and editors for media coverage. 
 Finally, a number of public diplomacy perpetrators exist in the private sector, although 
companies usually focus mainly on their own competitiveness and only secondarily on that of 
the US. An exception is Business for Diplomatic Action, a non-profit task force that guides 
multinational companies on communication and perception issues. Their mission is to “enlist 
the U.S. business community in actions to improve the standing of America in the world with 
the goal of once again, seeing America admired as a global leader and respected as a courier 
of progress and prosperity for all people”.6   
 The variety of perpetrators of public diplomacy that have emerged in the war on ter-
rorism era indicates a broad acknowledgement that foreign public opinion about the US has 
consequences for American economy and security. This increased focus also indicates that 
public diplomacy is perceived as a relevant tool in the war on terrorism, which is another cen-
tral notion of this thesis. 
2.2 The ‘War on Terror(ism)’ 
On September 20th, 2001, President George W. Bush formally declared war on terror during 
an address to a joint session of congress and the American people by saying, “Our war on ter-
ror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Bush, 20 September 2001). Since then, 
the notions ‘war on terror’ and ‘war on terrorism’ have been simultaneously widely estab-
lished and criticized. The very notions are inherently problematic. I will here briefly discuss 
some problems with the notions and how the Bush administration has related to them.  
The ‘war on terrorism’ is frequently used as an umbrella term for actions taken as a 
reaction to 9/11, which the US was a major force but far from sole perpetrator of. It can also 
be regarded as a doctrine enabling various measures for a common objective, to contain a cer-
                                                 
4 http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Rendon_Group#Afghanistan 
5 http://www.lincolngroup.com 
6 http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/who/index.html 
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tain terrorist threat. The terms ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘war on terror’ have been used inter-
changeably by the Bush administration and others. The difference between the two terms 
seems in this context to be larger in theory than in practice. Terrorism, according to Louise 
Richardson, means “deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes” 
(Richardson 2006, 20). Terror, on the other hand, is a broader term, referring variably to the 
feeling of intense fear and the person or situation causing it. But ‘terror’ is also British and 
American slang for terrorism. In practice, the Bush administration does not seem to make an 
actual difference between the two. The actions taken under the labels ‘war on terror(ism)’ re-
late to a specific kind of terrorism of global reach rather than terror or even terrorism in gen-
eral, which means that both terms are too broad to accurately describe the designated doctrine 
and actions. A conceptual problem with the term ‘war on terror(ism)’ is its oxymoronic char-
acter, a source of much ridicule throughout the world. Terrorism is not a group, not an ideol-
ogy, but a tactic. A war on a tactic, without a defined enemy, signifies no ending, and an end-
less undefined war is regarded by many as a state of terror.  
Many of the US’ actions against the terrorist threat have clear associations to war. The 
operations ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan and ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in Iraq fought under the 
label ‘war on terrorism’ have indeed been war operations. However, the American war on ter-
rorism involves more than a war. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from Feb-
ruary 2003 states that, 
 
“The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our his-
tory. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must 
fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around 
the world, using every instrument of national power – diplomatic, economic, law en-
forcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military” (Bush 2003, 1). 
 
To succeed, according to the National Strategy (Bush 2003, 29), all the elements of national 
power must be utilised to confront four fronts. The overall strategy is to 
1. Defeat terrorists and their organizations of global reach through relentless ac-
tion.  
2. Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support and sanctuary they need to survive.  
3. Win the war of ideas and diminish the underlying conditions that promote the 
despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to em-
brace, rather than shun, terrorism.  
4. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.  
In other words, the war on terrorism involves much more than a war and cannot be understood 
only in the terms of a war. The third point is subject for this thesis.  
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Since President George W. Bush started using the term ‘war on terror’ shortly after 
9/11, it has been target of much criticism. After Karen Hughes came into office in 2005, the 
Bush administration tried to change the slogan (Schmitt & Schanker 2005). Then Defence 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld referred in his later speeches to ‘global struggle against violent 
extremism’ rather than ‘war on terror’ (Ibid). Since 2006, the slogan of choice in the Bush 
administration has been ‘the long war’. President George W. Bush himself first used the new 
name in his 2006 State of the Union speech: “Our own generation is in a long war against a 
determined enemy” (Bush, 31 January 2006). None of these phrases have established in the 
war on terrorism discourse. Despite of these efforts, the term ‘war on terror’ is still in wide-
spread use. While the State Department uses the term ‘counterterrorism’ on its webpage, the 
Department of Defense is still using ‘war on terror’.   
 In this thesis, I will continue to use the term ‘war on terrorism’ despite of its inaccu-
racy, for two reasons. Firstly, the “war on terrorism” is the most established of the terms. Sec-
ondly, notions like the ‘long war’ refer to the military actions and hence are not wide enough 
a term for my purpose. It would make little sense to talk about the role of public diplomacy in 
‘the long war’. The ‘war on terrorism’ is used as an umbrella term and refers to political and 
legal as well as military actions. It grasps the purpose of the struggle, to contain terrorism, 
which is the logical link between the other actions and public diplomacy. Before I turn to 
what kind of weapon public diplomacy constitutes in the war on terrorism, I will discuss the 
role of this practice in a broader power structure.   
2.3 The Power Structure of the War on Terrorism  
In the war on terrorism, public diplomacy is a part of a broader network of power. Joseph S. 
Nye Jr. (2004) describes the space for agency in international issues with the metaphor ‘three-
dimensional chess game of world politics’. In this game, one can win “only by playing verti-
cally as well as horizontally” (Nye 2004, 4). The top of the board represents classic interstate 
military issues, where the United States is the only superpower with global military reach. At 
this level, the distribution of power can be understood in traditional terms of unipolarity or 
hegemony. The middle board represents interstate economic issues; and at this level, the dis-
tribution of power is multipolar and requires cooperation between different actors for desired 
outcomes to be obtained. The bottom board represents transnational issues like terrorism, in-
ternational crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. At this level, Nye ar-
gues, “power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and nonstate actors” 
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(Nye 2004, 4). The new challenge of international terrorism affects the space for American 
power at each of the three levels. 
 Nye argues that the distribution of power resources in the information age varies 
greatly on different issues. Influence can be achieved in different ways: coercion with threats; 
payments; or attraction and co-optation of people’s preferences. The last means is what Nye 
calls soft power, a term he first coined in 1990 in the book Bound to Lead, when he disputed 
the idea that the American hegemony was in decline. Soft power is “the ability to get what 
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004, x). Attraction is a 
substantial power resource because it shapes the preferences of others. However, the effect of 
soft power is far less tangible than hard power, creating general influence rather than produc-
ing an easily observable specific action. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three 
resources that produce such attraction: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), 
its political values (when it lives up to it at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when 
they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye 2004, 11). Public diplomacy 
can be both a soft power resource and a tool for communicating attractive power. 
  The term ‘soft power’ does not relate consistently to the metaphorical chessboard. 
Nye categorizes power in three dimensions as ‘military, economic and soft’, but also stresses 
the ‘soft’ dimensions of military and economic issues. Hard and soft powers can sometimes 
reinforce each other, and sometimes interfere (Nye 2004, 25). Especially post-industrial de-
mocracies demand legitimacy of warfare, which affects the role of military power, and war 
affects the trust necessary for the flows of capital in a globalised economy. Likewise, issues 
like terrorism have economic and military aspects, but the success of these resources, for both 
terrorists and counterterrorist practices, depends on soft power.  
2.3.1 The Soft Power of Terrorism  
In the three-dimensional game, Nye argues, “you will lose if you focus only on one board and 
fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them” (Nye 2004, 137). He 
exemplifies this with the military actions in the war on terrorism on the top board of the 
chessboard, which simultaneously on the bottom board increased the ability of the Al Qaeda 
network to recruit more members. The bottom board requires a different set of resources 
where military and economic resources are insufficient. This relates to Telhami’s (2002) dis-
tinction between the supply- and the demand sides of terrorism. Telhami argues that the US 
has pursued a ‘supply side-only’ approach by “regarding terrorism as the product of organ-
ized groups that could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or 
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to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members” (Telhami 2002, 13). 
Targeting the demand side is equally important for the terrorism phenomenon to be contained, 
because suppliers will continue to arise to exploit the persistent demand.  
 The war on terrorism is not conducted against terrorists in general, but against a spe-
cific kind of terrorism with a global reach rooted in a radical Islamist movement. Muslims, 
however, have historically not been a group associated with terrorism. Due to their reputation 
of accepting problems as “God’s will”, Muslims have been regarded as a rather predictable 
and favourable business partner (Telhami 2002). Likewise, the United States was not 
very high on jihadis’ lists of targets throughout the Cold War and until mid-1990s. American 
foreign policy and political Islam rather aligned in a marriage of convenience to prevent the 
further expansion of Communism and radical secularism (Gerges 2005). Since 9/11, Gerges 
argues, relations between the United States and Islamists have been portrayed as having al-
ways been on a collision course and fated to a military clash (Ibid, 70). Because this idea has 
become established, it has guided several geopolitical practices under the label ‘war on terror-
ism’. Gerges argues that the Bush administration through rhetoric and actions has played into 
Al Qaeda’s hands by lashing out militarily against the ummah (the Muslim community 
worldwide).  
 The three-dimensional chess game is an appropriate metaphor also for Al Qaeda’s 
power resources: it depends on soft power for financial support and recruitment of warriors. 
Al Qaeda only represents a tiny minority among jihadis, jihadis only a tiny minority among 
Islamists, and because it is widely rejected by the ummah, the mobilizing potential is meagre. 
In order to mobilise support, Al Qaeda employed a strategy of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ 
of the ummah by portraying them in an alliance against a common enemy. They adopted the 
slogan of “liberating the ummah of its foreign enemies” and portrayed it “as a battle between 
Islam and kufr [impiety] and kufar [infidels]” (Gerges 2005, 26, brackets in original). The 
9/11 attacks were according to Fawaz Gerges an act of desperation that aimed to save the 
crippling jihadist movement by precipitating a ‘clash of civilizations’ with the West that 
would bring the ummah into the battle on the jihadist side. When measured by this standard, 
the 9/11 attacks were an utter failure: Islamic opinion after the 9/11 attacks was almost uni-
versally critical of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, the ‘clash’-discourse has 
been mirrored by the West, and is a source of the discursive struggle about public diplomacy 
in the war on terrorism. As I will discuss in part 2 of this thesis, there is a concern that the rep-
resentations of natural enemies and clash of civilizations have both increased the terror threat 
and contributed to the general decline of American soft power. An aspiration of American 
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public diplomacy efforts has been to deconstruct the representation of enemies and recon-
struct new alliances. This aspiration has culminated in a variety of expressions.  
2.3.2 Public Diplomacy against Terrorism   
A source of much ridicule in international press since 9/11 is the idea that public diplomacy is 
supposed to “fix it all”, often expressed as “to know us is to love us”, or that simple persua-
sive efforts are supposed to turn terrorists into friends. However, there does not seem to be a 
customary belief in public diplomacy circles that the threat of terrorism can solely be coun-
tered with public diplomacy. It is rather regarded as a tool for (re-)framing the image of the 
US’ culture and policy that together with other actions can turn the unfavourable public opin-
ion. Much frustration in public diplomacy circles is vented towards military and political ac-
tions in the war on terrorism that are perceived to interfere with rather than reinforce Ameri-
can soft power. 
 The target audience of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism is not the terrorists, 
but the people they might influence. In order to succeed, terrorist organisations need to re-
cruit willing members, raise funds, and appeal to public opinion in pursuit of their political 
objectives. Public diplomacy efforts are designed to reach the same public opinion ahead of a 
potential radicalisation, and create an understanding or acceptance for the American point of 
view. But even though 9/11 was the catalyst that brought public diplomacy back on the 
agenda, only a small amount of public diplomacy efforts in the war on terrorism era have been 
specifically designated to counter terrorism, and those who are, usually have a broader pur-
pose.   
 A rare example of a public diplomacy effort directly targeted to counter terrorism is 
Charlotte Beers’ 2001 revival of the SD communication program Rewards for Justice, which 
started running already in 1984. The program includes a website (www.rewardsforjustice.net), 
posters and leaflets. Prior to Beers’ involvement, Rewards for Justice looked like Wanted-
posters, featuring mug shots of terrorists with biographical data and information about how to 
call in tips and collect awards. Beers recommended that the campaign should be directed to-
wards those who are most likely to have information about terrorists and turn them in, which 
according to her panel of counter-terrorist experts were women. Based on that recommenda-
tion, the posters were replaced with subtle ads that should appeal to the desire for safety, such 
as one ad featuring the headline “Can a woman stop terrorism?” (Fullerton and Kendrick 
2006, 82). This campaign is an overt attempt to make an alliance with Muslim women against 
terrorists. 
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 Most public diplomacy efforts, however, are more indirectly targeted to countering 
terrorism. The Shared Values Initiative (SVI), which will be analysed in chapter 6, is an ex-
ample of such. It aims to reach out to the critical middle by claiming that Muslims and 
Americans live in peaceful coexistence, but does not explicitly state that it is an effort against 
terrorism.  
2.4 Summary 
This thesis rests upon several ambiguous concepts, including core notions such as ‘public di-
plomacy’ and the ‘war on terrorism’. Public diplomacy has many competing definitions, 
which I have sorted on a continuum from its intention, through its function to its effect. The 
concept is often defined in relation or negation to traditional diplomacy on the one hand, and 
strategic communication, public affairs, psy-ops, propaganda and spin on the other. Various 
agents perform public diplomacy tasks, of which a few are specially designated to improve 
the public opinion of strategic audiences in the war on terrorism: The SD, BBG and DoD. In 
addition, the DoD has outsourced some public diplomacy tasks to private communications 
agencies, and businesses are becoming increasingly involved in similar activities. Public di-
plomacy has become reinvigorated as a coordinated strategy in the war on terrorism. Its role 
in this strategy is to enhance the soft power of the US and win the hearts and minds of the 
critical middle that potentially could be persuaded by terrorist motives. Most public diplo-
macy efforts, however, are designed with compound intentions and do not explicate their role 
in the war on terrorism. 

3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The analytical purpose of this thesis is to find out how geopolitical reasoning direct public 
diplomacy practices and messages in the war on terrorism era. Such an analysis is about how 
meaning is produced, reproduced and changed, and not to assess the legitimacy or truthfulness 
of any claims of reality. Discourse analysis is suited for this purpose because it seeks to find 
the systems through which the world appears as meaningful to subjects. This thesis draws 
from the terms and concepts from different discourse theories. A moot point among discourse 
theorists relates to whether different approaches with diverging methodological foundations 
can be mixed. I follow Jørgensen and Phillips’ (1999) stance on this issue: different ap-
proaches can profitably be combined according to the subject matter, because it enables the 
analysis to grasp different aspects of a discourse.  
As the aim is to find a specific kind of meaning, a geopolitical rationale, the discourse 
analysis is supplied with Security analysis and geopolitical theory. The discourse theory and 
the geopolitical framework constitute the two levels of the analytical strategy: respectively the 
strategy employed to find meaning and the specific kind of meaning that will be analysed. Al-
though the Security analysis is something between these categories, it will be incorporated in 
the discourse theory due to its function in the theoretical framework.  
 The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, I will present the discourse theory, 
then the geopolitical framework, and finally, I will theoretically operationalise the research 
question based on the discussed theory.   
3.1 Discourse Theoretical Framework 
In the first part of the theory chapter, I will outline a framework for explaining how meaning 
is produced and changed through exchanges of different discourses. The theoretical frame-
work draws from as different scholars as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985; 2001), 
Norman Fairclough (2003), Katherine R. Young (1987), Mikhail Bakhtin [1963] and the Co-
penhagen School of Security analysis (Buzan et al, 1998). The theoretical aspiration is to 
compose a framework that can explain different levels of discourses, from implicit representa-
tions to hierarchies between discourses. I will discuss how production of meaning occurs; 
how different discourses influence each other; how discourses are limited and changed; and 
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finally, how the rules of the discourse depend on how political issues are framed. In order to 
outline a coherent theoretical framework, I will theoretically “translate” some concepts.  
3.1.1 The Social Production of Meaning  
Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory builds on an understanding of language that derives 
from structuralism, post-structuralism and structural Marxism. The theory comprises episte-
mological and ontological reflections as well as a toolbox of notions that can be used for dis-
course analysis. To begin at an abstract level, the theory explains how the social production of 
meaning occurs.  
Laclau and Mouffe combine the Gramscian theory of hegemony with semiotic terms 
to explain how discourses arise. In abstract terms, the discourse is established when meaning 
crystallises around certain nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, xi). Nodal points are float-
ing signifiers, which means they have different meanings in other discourses. These signifiers 
have no predetermined meaning: they attain their meaning in co-articulation with other signs. 
Depending on the discourse, an articulation constructs the relation between signs, which are 
categorised with the semiotic terms moments and elements. A moment is a sign (a word, 
phrase, practice, etc.) with a fixed meaning in the discourse, while an element has an unde-
termined meaning. At some level, every articulation in a discourse tries to turn elements into 
moments, or in other words, to define something: to distinguish what it is from what it is not 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Because all articulations continuously challenge or reproduce dis-
courses, discourses are constantly changing. The understanding of meaning to the Structuralist 
tradition can be explained with an allegory of a fishnet (Jørgensen and Philips 1999). In the 
fishnet all the signs can be understood as nodes, which attain meaning by being different from 
each other and localised on specific places of the net. Laclau and Mouffe follow Jacques Der-
rida’s critique of this allegory. Derrida, followed by the Post-Structuralist tradition, acknowl-
edged that the signs attain meaning through their reciprocal difference, but in a different sense 
than to the Structuralist tradition. In practice, signs are placed in varying relations to each 
other (‘differential positions’), and thereby, attain different connotations. In Laclau and 
Mouffes’ discourse theory, the social production of meaning is about fixing the floating signi-
fiers, as if there was an objective fishnet structure (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 35).  
All other possible meanings that the discourse excludes constitute what Laclau and 
Mouffe call the field of discursivity. Because a sign attains meaning from other signs, it ex-
cludes other meanings. In cases where it does not attain meaning from its difference from 
other signs, but stands unchallenged as the only signifier, Laclau and Mouffe call it a hege-
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monic discourse. A hegemonic discourse consists of elements that are made into moments by 
a discursive closure. In practice, this means that a discourse is perceived to be objective. But 
in the terms of the discourse theory, hegemony is impossible in the end, because all determi-
nacy of meaning is contingent: possible, but not necessary (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 61). 
The overall aim of Laclau and Mouffes discourse analysis is to map discursive struggle: the 
processes in which the fixation of meaning is negotiated, and where meaning becomes so 
conventionalised that we perceive it as natural (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). An articulation ac-
tively formed to intervene in the discursive struggle against a perceived hegemonic or domi-
nating discourse will in this thesis be called a counter discourse. 
 Because the discourse theory explains only what is given meaning and distinguishes 
sharply between discourse and the field of discursivity, it offers no notions about how dis-
courses are influenced by excluded discourses. Sentiment or attitudes towards a discourse 
cannot be explained by the discourse analysis unless they are expressed in another discourse. 
To explain the relation between discourses, I will supply the theoretical framework with per-
spectives from Bakhtin and Young. 
3.1.2 Relational Discourses 
Discourses can be analysed on many levels. Polyphony is Greek for “many voices” and in 
Bakhtin’s concept it refers to the existence of many discourses in one and the same. What is 
characteristic for polyphonic articulations is their double focus: they focus at the same time on 
its own content as some other discursive context. Bakhtin distinguishes between three kinds 
of polyphonic articulations. The first kind is about imitation: articulations that imitate or copy 
the style of previous articulations. For the second kind, parody is typical. In parody, two in-
tentions collide and the new voice forces the first to serve other purposes than intended. 
Common for these two polyphonic articulations is the passive role of the other voice: it is de-
fenceless in somebody else’s discourse. In the third kind, there is an active connection be-
tween the discourses. It comprises all kinds of articulations that are affected by the awareness 
of other’s discourse. The other’s discourse is not reproduced, but it affects the discourse of the 
speaker while it stays outside its boundaries (Børtnes 1999)7. Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony 
gives a more substantial insight in parallel discourses than Laclau and Mouffes’ notion of the 
field of discursivity does, because it takes into account that a discourse can be included and 
excluded at the same time. Polyphony admits to the influence of excluded discourses, even 
when they only exist in the awareness of the speaker without being articulated.   
                                                 
7 http://www.hum.au.dk/romansk/polyfoni/Tribune9/borstnestrib.htm 
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 Young (1987) draws from a phenomenological perspective and writes about told sto-
ries, or more specific, about the Brits’ telling of good stories, but some of her notions are use-
ful also for analysing the relationship between discourses and meta- or counter discourses. 
She draws a boundary between the Storyrealm and the Taleworld to emphasize the impact of 
context for every story. This boundary locates the literal or physical border between dis-
courses. In the Taleworld, the tale that is told, persons and events follow their own ontological 
conventions. The Storyrealm is where the tale is told and framed.  
 
Storyrealm Taleworld 
The storyteller and the audience The tale  
 Figure 3.1: The Boundary Between Discourses 
 
Two points should here be made. Firstly, similarity or contiguity between realms allows 
meaning to leak from one context to another. For instance, Young writes, the “meaning” of a 
dream can be interpreted by a linguistic integration into the order of everyday. The dream 
now becomes meaningful in terms of everyday life rather than of its own terms (Young 1987, 
11). This point can be made about any tale: it’s meaning is understood in terms of the 
Storyrealm wherein it is articulated. Secondly, the way the tale is framed in the Storyrealm 
affects the status of or attitude toward either the Taleworld or the Storyrealm. The status of 
one, Young argues, “bears on but does not fix the status of the other” (Ibid, 22). When a sto-
ryteller frames the conceptual limits between realms, the meaning as well as the framed status 
transferred from one realm to another needs inter-realm resonance. Or simpler put, in the con-
text of this thesis: In order for a tale to be credible, it must be framed in accordance with per-
ceptions that already exist in the Storyrealm. 
 
Storyrealm Taleworld 
Affects the meaning of and attitudes towards 
the tale  
Affects the attitudes towards the storyteller 
and her framing of the tale 
   Figure 3.2: How Meaning and Attitudes Leak between Realms 
 
A methodological problem with the notions of Taleworld and Storyrealm is that these realms 
are relationally dependent yet not mutually excluding. It is useful to see these realms meta-
phorically as Matrjosjka-puppets: One and the same story can be the mother of one tale and 
the child of another. However, the level upon which the notions are used should be clear from 
the context. 
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 In the forthcoming analysis, I will incorporate Bakhtin, Young, and Laclau and 
Mouffes’ theories into a coherent framework to find relations and boundaries between dis-
courses through polyphony and negation. This analytical strategy will reveal how certain tales 
guide the Storyrealm of various discourses that are involved in a discursive struggle. How the 
discursive struggle unfolds will be explained by Fairclough’s concept of ‘order of discourse’.  
3.1.3 The Struggle for Discursive Hegemony 
The ‘order of discourse’ is a “particular combination or configuration of genres, discourses 
and styles, which constitutes the discoursal aspect of a network of social practices”8 (Fair-
clough 2003, 220). It can be described as a social field of discursive conflict, and can on a cer-
tain level explain how discursive struggle and hegemony occur: all genres and discourses of a 
communicative action compete for authority on a subject matter (Jørgensen and Philips 1999). 
Fairclough describes the relationship between a communicative action and the order of dis-
course, as dialectic (Ibid, 83). The discourses and genres of an order of discourse constitute 
the resources available within that order of discourse, which limits the premises of the dis-
course. Simultaneously, the speaker can change the order of discourse by drawing on dis-
courses or genres from other orders of discourse. Articulation of different discourses within 
and across different orders of discourse witnesses what Fairclough calls interdiscursivity, 
which moves the borders within and between orders of discourse. Interdiscursivity is a form 
of intertextuality, which refers to the influence of history on a text and the influence of a text 
on the history: every text draws from previous texts and contributes to the historical develop-
ment of texts. Intertextuality has in principle the same function as Laclau and Mouffes’ notion 
articulation, in the sense that it draws on existing patterns to form new ones (Jørgensen and 
Philips 1999, 145).    
 Different discourses draw on the intertextual history of the discourse and communicate 
through different genres. “The genres associated with a particular network of social practices 
constitute a potential which is variably drawn upon in actual texts and interactions” (Fair-
clough 2003, 69; emphasis in original). Fairclough distinguishes between three different sub-
categories of genres, ‘pre-genre’, ‘disembedded genre’ and ‘situated genre’. He uses ‘pre-
genre’ for “the most abstract categories like Narrative, ‘disembedded genre’ for somewhat 
less abstract categories like Interview, ‘situated genre’ for genres which are specific to par-
ticular networks of practices such as ‘ethnographic interview’” (Ibid). This differentiation is 
                                                 
8 Fairclough separates between discourses and social practices in a different way than I will in this thesis, which 
I will come back to in chapter 4.  
 33
useful also for my purpose, but because this thesis is about other kinds of genres, I will use 
these terms differently. Linked to the geopolitical framework that will be discussed shortly; 
popular, formal and practical geopolitics can be regarded as pre-genres with dissimilar poten-
tials. In this context, public diplomacy can belong to a disembedded genre and public rela-
tions, advertising and propaganda to a situated genre.  
 
Subcategories Concept 
Pre-genre Popular, formal and practical geopolitics 
Disembedded genre Public diplomacy 
Situated genre Propaganda, public relations, advertising, etc. 
      Figure 3.3: Subcategories of Genres 
 
Which genre a discourse is identified with, greatly affects the rules and conception of the dis-
course. In an order of discourse, different discourses have diverging opportunities to use the 
same genres. For instance, it is far more controversial for a government to employ the propa-
ganda genre than any actor in the private sector, because their activities are situated in differ-
ent games of power. What is considered as controversial or conventional in the discourse is 
produced by the genre and the intertextual history of the discourse, and for the same reason; 
this is subject to change.  
 A main aspiration of Fairclough’s theory is to map societal change, of which discur-
sive change is an expression. Fairclough sees the main tendency in the neo-liberal ‘marketiza-
tion-discourse’ that has diffused into most aspects of daily life, particularly where the welfare-
discourse previously dominated (Fairclough 1992; 1998). Several examples of contemporary 
societal organisation and reorganisation can demonstrate Fairclough’s point. However, in 
some social areas neo-liberalism seems to be in retreat. According to Anderson (2004), neo-
liberalism has since 9/11 been giving way to neo-conservativism, with increased focus on the 
state, state borders, security and military power. The discussion about public diplomacy in the 
war on terrorism era in part 2 will exemplify how the marketization discourse in some ways 
has weakened its position and given way to a security imperative. 
 The theoretical concept of ‘order of discourse’ will be a structuring foundation of the 
forthcoming analysis, combined in a particular way with the Security analysis of the Copen-
hagen school of security studies.  
3.1.4 Framework for a Differentiated Security-‘Order of Discourse’-Analysis  
The Copenhagen School is a school of thought with origins in international relations that 
places particular emphasis upon the social aspects of security. The concept of securitization is 
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central: It is argued that ‘security’ is a speech act with distinct consequences in international 
politics. By “talking” security an actor tries to move a topic away from politics and into an 
area of security in order to justify extraordinary means. The speech act “security” is a matter 
of framing a political issue as a matter of security, rather than speaking the word. Securitiza-
tion is studied by its effect: an issue is securitized when the audience tolerates violations of 
rules that otherwise would have to be obeyed. Presenting something as a security threat is a 
securitizing move, but an issue is successfully securitized only when the audience accepts it as 
such. 
 According to the theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from 
nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized. An issue is nonpoliticized when it is not 
dealt with by the state or made an issue of public debate; politicized when it is part of public 
policy and requires government decision and resource allocations, and securitized when it is 
presented as an existential threat that requires emergency measures. Securitization is a more 
extreme version of politicization because it “takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al 
1998, 23).    
 Although securitization is an intensification of politicization in the sense that it 
strengthens the role of the state, the implications can be the exact opposite. The substantial 
difference between politicization and securitization is how an issue is regarded: “Politicization 
means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon 
and that therefore entails responsibility” (Ibid, 29). Securitization means to present an issue 
as urgent and existential, important enough to legitimize secrecy and disregard for democratic 
rules. In national politics, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of the constitut-
ing principle of sovereignty or against the ideology of the state (Ibid). International regimes 
can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine their constituting rules, norms, 
and institutions. I will come back to the social construction of threats later in this chapter. 
 The Security analysis specifically describes the self-legitimising function of security, 
although other kinds of framing also have the effect of moving the responsibility for and con-
trol over an issue away from politics into spheres where democratic rules do not apply. Such 
frames, which in accordance with the theory can be labelled ‘non-politicized’, justify the shift 
of control over an issue to experts, religious leaders, jurists, the family, the private sector, etc. 
A problem with locating ‘non-politicized’ issues on the opposite side of the spectrum to secu-
rity is that they appear as less relevant or less powerful. A set of frames with this function that 
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is relevant for analysing public diplomacy is marketization, which follows an economic im-
perative rather than a political and hence to a less extent abides by democratic rules. 
 There can be several ambiguities in a process of securitization that the security analy-
sis does not register, because it regards the process as one movement. One and the same issue 
can be a matter of politicization and securitization in different discourses, such as anti-
Americanism, which I will analyse in part 2 of this thesis. Moreover: the security analysis dis-
tinguishes between a securitizing move and a securitized issue according to whether it is ac-
cepted as such by the audience. A more differentiating theoretical framework could have 
shown that, who the audience is and what the accept entails, varies with the discourse. An in-
corporation of Fairclough’s concept of order of discourse in the security analysis can elevate 
the discursive struggle behind the securitization process to highlight a variation of movements 
with different functions. In this particular combination of theories, securitization is regarded 
as one distinct discourse in an order of discourse with parallel discourses. 
 I will later analyse a distinct order of discourse that I have called ‘public diplomacy in 
the war on terrorism era’ (PDWTE). In the PDWTE order of discourse, various discourses are 
in different ways involved in a discursive struggle about anti-Americanism and public diplo-
macy. Following the Copenhagen-school, I will crudely divide the discourses into three cate-
gories, but instead of the category of ‘non-politicized’ discourse, I will use Fairclough’s con-
cept of marketization. The three discourses I will discuss are thus marketized, politicized- and 
securitized discourses. Each discourse is based on a set of tales about the threat and its conse-
quences, and each has its own set of discursive resources (intertextual history and genres) and 
relative power to meet the threats. To find patterns of meaning in these discourses, I will use 
Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory, and to find polyphonic exchanges between the dis-
courses I will use Bakhtin and Youngs’ notions. I will now turn to the geopolitical meaning I 
will search for in the discourse analysis. 
3.2 Geopolitical Approach 
Critical geopolitics, which is the geopolitical approach of this thesis, is a constructivist, post-
Marxist approach to the geographical reasoning of all kinds of politics. The label ‘critical 
geopolitics’ refers to a school of thought as well as distinct theories associated with this theo-
retical enterprise. I will in the following discuss a theoretical framework that explains the 
geopolitical function of discourses. On a macro level, the geopolitical function of discourses 
is to direct geopolitical practices and hence contribute to reproducing the geopolitical order, 
and on a micro level it is to designate agents and threats through the establishment of geopo-
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litical identities. But first, I will briefly discuss the origin and development of the concept of 
geopolitics and the critical and geographical aspects of critical geopolitics as a school of 
thought.  
3.2.1 The Origin and the Critical Turn   
The term ‘geopolitics’ was coined by Rudolf Kjellèn in 1899, and firstly became associated 
with the model of geographical influences on global conflict proposed by the British geogra-
pher Halford Mackinder in the early twentieth century, as an aid to the practice of British 
statecraft. After German geographers in the 1920s and 1930s adopted Mackinder’s model of a 
Eurasian ‘heartland’ and used it to justify Nazi expansionism on Eastern Europe, the term 
‘geopolitics’ suffered from guilt by association, and fell into disuse (Agnew & Corbridge 
1995, 1). In the mid-80s and following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a loose group of politi-
cal geographers and international relations scholars articulated a post-Marxist reformulation 
of geopolitics. They propose a constructivist approach to geopolitics that deconstructs the 
ideological presuppositions of geographical knowledge and practices. Geography is seen as a 
social discourse that has been construed and constructed by ideology and politics, and dif-
fused into all aspects of social life. A central notion is ‘hegemony’, which is derived from the 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and developed into a geopolitical perspective. The critical 
aspect of this approach is thus a combination of Marxist and post-modern perspectives on 
power.  
 The approach is also essentially geographical, in its analysis of how places form the 
premises for the reductive geopolitical reasoning of intellectuals of statecraft. This practice, 
Agnew and Ó Tuathail argue, ‘spatializes’ international politics “in such a way as to represent 
it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (Agnew  & Ó 
Tuathail 1992, 80). These representations of space, in turn, are the guidelines for further geo-
political practice. In other words, this approach to geopolitics suggests there is a dialectical 
relationship between representations of space and spatial practices. This is what Agnew and 
Corbridge (1995) call geopolitical order and –discourse: respectively the organization of spa-
tial practices and the discursive consent-production and reproduction of the geopolitical or-
der9. I will in the following discuss the dialectics between geopolitical practices and genres 
and representations. 
                                                 
9 The notion ‘geopolitical order’ should not be confused with the notion ‘order of discourse’ discussed previ-
ously. 
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3.2.2 Pre-genres and Representations Guide Spatial Practices 
The geopolitical aspect of discourse involves how representations of space guide actions to-
wards a geographical area or a people. Agnew and Corbridge refer to the term ‘geopolitical 
discourse’ as “how the geography of the international political economy has been ‘written and 
read’ in the practices of foreign economic policies during the different periods of geopolitical 
order” (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 46). By ‘written’ they refer to “the way geographical rep-
resentations are incorporated into the practices of the political elites”, and by ‘read’: “the 
ways in which these representations are communicated” (Ibid, 46-47). How the geography is 
written and read depends on two discursive aspects: pre-genres and representations. 
3.2.2.1 Geopolitical Pre-genres  
Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1998) add an extra dimension to Agnew and Cor-
bridges’ theory by emphasising the broad social and cultural extent of geopolitics. Their ap-
proach to critical geopolitics is to regard geopolitics as a set of representational practices, 
which I will merge with the previously discussed notion of ‘pre-genre’.  
 The broadness of geopolitics is demonstrated with a three-fold typology that distin-
guishes the practical geopolitics of state leaders and foreign policy bureaucracy from the for-
mal geopolitics of the strategic community nationally and internationally and the popular 
geopolitics of trans-national popular culture. Linked together, as shown in figure 4.4, they 
“comprise the geopolitical culture of a particular region, state or inter-state alliance” (Ó 
Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 5). 
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Figure 3.4: The Geopolitical Culture (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998) 
 
The figure opens an understanding of three issues. Firstly, based on Agnew and Corbridges’ 
theory, the figure emphasises the dialectics of geopolitical practices and representations. Sec-
ondly, the figure points at the relationship between the geopolitical imagination and the geo-
political map over the world, as I will come back to. Thirdly, it takes into account a variety of 
agents producing geopolitical discourse who operate according to different logics. Investigat-
ing geopolitics at only one of the three suggested levels, or either of them separately, misses 
out on an important dimension of geopolitics. The diffusion of norms and ideas creates a 
‘smooth space’ of rule, “constitutive of the very power that enables the US and its allied gov-
ernments and organizations to act” (Allen 2003, 105). The formal geopolitical reasoning of 
the strategic community, Simon Dalby argues, has the ability to mystify politics through spe-
cialized discourses. They “act to reduce the role of political discussion by recasting the politi-
cal issues in terms of technical problems to which they can, by using their specialized proce-
dures, find ‘correct’ or ‘optimal’ answers” (Dalby 1990, 11). Popular geopolitics is important 
due to its wide reach, both in number of addressees and the ability to permeate people’s eve-
ryday lives with imperceptible geopolitical reasoning. The space for practical geopolitics is 
seen as ‘smoother’ if it shares the depoliticized reasoning of formal and popular geopolitics; 
and practical geopolitics nurtures the narration of popular and formal geopolitics.  
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The model can be described as a deductive approach to finding specific types of geo-
politics in traditions, tendencies, practices and debates. For a more inductive research ap-
proach, I see more utility in understanding popular, formal and practical geopolitics as genres, 
or more specifically, pre-genres, in a liberal interpretation of Fairclough’s notion. A pre-genre 
is in this context a constituting part of a geopolitical practice that determines the ways in 
which geopolitical discourses are, or can be, produced and consumed. The reasoning around 
issues common for the respective categories of geopolitics can be the same, yet communi-
cated and understood in completely different terms.  
A conceptual problem is also circumvented when the categories ‘popular’, ‘formal’ 
and ‘practical’ geopolitics are regarded as pre-genres rather than reasoning: otherwise, the 
model would artificially separate between overlapping forms of reasoning. For example, the 
mass media does not only facilitate popular geopolitics, but also the mediation of formal and 
practical geopolitical reasoning, albeit usually in a hybrid form. Academic discourses are 
more likely to be accepted by mass media when it mixes academic- with popular discourses, 
and exclusively popular discourses have less credence in mass media than popular-
political/academic discourses. When regarding popular geopolitics as a pre-genre, what is dis-
covered is that mass media, for instance, is merely a generative facilitator for reasoning, 
which simultaneously affects how the message is produced and consumed. 
3.2.2.2 Geopolitical Representations  
The second aspect of geopolitical dialectics is how geopolitical representations direct geopo-
litical practices. This discursive process is what John Allen (2003, 102) calls the politics of 
geo-graphing space, that is, “writing or representing it in ways that justify a particular group’s 
authority over a subject population.” In this sense, hegemonic ideas embedded in geopolitical 
discourses reify themselves in foreign policy making. This is the dialectic aspect of the rela-
tionship between the geopolitical imagination and the geopolitical map of the world, as visu-
alised on figure 4.4. By rendering certain geographical understandings ‘obvious’, intellectu-
als, institutions and practising statespersons justify the right of a political entity to exercise 
power, based upon geopolitical visions. “In writing such scenarios,” Allen argues, “geo-
graphical metaphors and tropes come into play, such as the identification of ‘rogue states’ re-
cently deployed by the US and its allies in their ‘war’ against ‘terrorism’, as well as rhetorical 
proclamations such as the ‘clash of civilizations’ and the ‘end of history’” (Allen 2003, 102). 
Gertjan Dijkink defines geopolitical imaginations or visions as “any idea concerning the rela-
tion between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage 
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(and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy” (Dijkink 1996, 
11). His specific approach to geopolitics is the power to define danger, and hence to prescribe 
the remedy to provide security. A crucial discursive task of geopolitics, then, is to construct 
the popular understanding of order and threat. Linked together with figure 4.4, the under-
standing of order and threat has the ability to diffuse between geopolitical agents through the 
various genres of geopolitics and together create a ‘smooth space of rule’. 
A geopolitical vision is often organised around a distinct geopolitical subject, which in 
geopolitical theory is understood as the basic agent shaping global political and eco-
nomic relations (Kearns 2003, 174). I will base the understanding of a geopolitical subject 
upon the perspective of geopolitical representations and Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse the-
ory. This approach to geopolitical subjects elevates the status of the represented ‘Other’ to a 
geopolitical subject. 
 Subjects are in Laclau & Mouffes discourse theory understood to be determined by the 
discourse. The discourse theory derives its understanding of the subject from the French psy-
choanalyst Jacques Lacan and, via Michel Foucault, the French structural-Marxist Louis Al-
thusser. To Lacan, the subject knows herself by identifying with something external and 
therefore constantly tries to “find herself” in the discourses (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 55). 
The nodal points of identity, or master signifiers, in Lacanian terminology, are in different 
discourses given meaning in different ways. The master signifier is a sign with the ability to 
construct a node of definite meanings, such as man, woman, American, Muslim or any other 
kind of identity category. The way the subject is given meaning, is how different signifiers are 
connected in chains of equivalence or difference, which establish the identity relationally to 
what it is and what it is not. At once the subject’s identity has been identified; discourses then 
give guidelines for the subject. By identifying with a master signifier, the subject also identi-
fies with and tries to live up to what this master signifier positively connotes within the given 
discourse. Likewise, the negative/opposition to this chain of equivalent meanings constitutes 
the Other, because the subject attains meaning through being different from something else 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Not only the Other is understood in terms of the Self, but the Self 
is also understood in terms of the constructed Other. In this sense, identity is completely a so-
cial construction (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 55).  
Groups, such as ‘Americans’ or ‘Muslims’, are according to Laclau constructed in the 
same way as the subject. When a group is represented, an image of the rest of the society fol-
lows accordingly, because the group is constituted in negation to other groups. An identity 
can thus not be separated from its context, because the context is constituted on the differen-
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tiation of the group (Laclau 1996). The construction of states follows the same logic: the his-
tory of statehood is about drawing borders to distinguish a state from what it is not. Moreover, 
the construction of the state has founded the state as a national community and defined the 
people at the inside as different from those at the outside. The geopolitical identity of a state 
or other geographic entity is applied to the members of the states. A geopolitical subject is 
thus any discursively represented identity and the geopolitical representation it is associated 
with. How a geopolitical subject is represented, affects how it should be acted towards in any 
given situation.  
Although identities are mutually excluding according to the logic of Laclau and 
Mouffes’ theory, geopolitical subjects can form alliances for common (symmetric or asym-
metric) benefit. In the book The Origin of Alliances, Stephen M. Walt (1987) explores the 
alliance formation of states and argues that they either balance or bandwagon when con-
fronted by an external threat. Balancing means allying with others against the prevailing 
threat and bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger (Walt 1987, 17). Ideo-
logical solidarity is another explanation of alliance formation: the more similar states are, the 
more likely they are to ally (Walt 1987, 33). I will not focus on states in this thesis, but rather 
how discourses construct alliances between geopolitical subjects that give guidelines for the 
involved subjects. As I will analyse in part 2 of this thesis, the micro level of the geopolitical 
rationale of public diplomacy is how identities are established in discourses. The logic of the 
geopolitical dialectics emphasizes how the subjects’ position and discursive guidelines direct 
what they can do and say within the geopolitical order.  
The notion of soft power discussed in chapter 2 highlights the agency aspect of the 
geopolitical dialectics. Agents with soft power have the ability to persuade others of the ap-
propriateness of their own geopolitical visions, or the definition of the involved subjects and 
threats. Soft power gives a geopolitical vision the ability to diffuse through the geopolitical 
culture and be expressed through genres and discourses with different range. 
3.2.3 Spatial Practices Reproduce the Geopolitical Order 
The significance of geopolitical discourses is how they guide spatial practices that in turn 
constitute the geopolitical order. Since the school of critical geopolitics started its theoretical 
enterprise in the mid-nineties the notion of ‘geopolitical order’ has been contested and devel-
oped in different directions. In the book Mastering Space from 1995, Agnew and Corbridge 
defined ‘geopolitical order’ as the organisation of spatial practices; “the routinized rules, insti-
tutions, activities and strategies through which the international political economy operates in 
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different historical periods” (1995, 15). An important development of the concept is who or 
what is perceived as the hegemon of the geopolitical order.10 In 1995, Agnew and Corbridge 
defined the geopolitical order as a state of hegemony, without a hegemonic state. At the time, 
this was a radical statement, because there was broad agreement that Pax Americana consti-
tuted the geopolitical order. In Agnew’s later book Hegemony: the New Shape of Global 
Power from 2005, he returns to the claim that the current geopolitical order is created by the 
US. Agnew argues that the contemporary world economy is a historical product of US design 
and ideology, which gained its position through the geographic expansion of economic prac-
tices. The marketplace society, mass consumer culture and the American way of conducting 
business have become a global condition: the right, acceptable and desirable form of human 
life. It developed in the nineteenth century in a rather national context but later materialized 
globally as the US model of conducting business expanded under the auspices of the US gov-
ernments in the twentieth century.  
An important criticism of Agnew’s book is the ambiguity of the role and meaning of 
agency in the historical development of the American hegemony. Agnew does not suggest 
that the creation of American hegemony has been a ‘project’ with a master plan, but rather 
shows how political-economic events have followed each other. I will not suggest that the 
American hegemony is a manufactured product, but the practice of public diplomacy is only 
one example of how the US government as well as several distinct agents and discourses have 
been important navigators in its making. Powerful networks such as Pax Americana during 
the Cold War and the neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) respec-
tively had and have clear geopolitical aspirations: The former promoted a new age of enlight-
enment, called The American Century, the latter aggressively upholds the idea of the Ameri-
can leadership of the world. Together with the proactive US government, CIA, USIA and 
other institutions, these networks have contributed to creating and nurturing the American he-
gemony. The case of governmental public diplomacy demonstrates how geopolitical dis-
courses are used strategically to reproduce the geopolitical order.  
3.3 Summary and Operationalisation of the Research Question  
I have in chapter 3 outlined a coherent theoretical framework that integrates discourse theory 
and the geopolitical approach. The discourse theory and the geopolitical framework constitute 
                                                 
10 The notion of hegemony in this context must not be confused with Laclau and Mouffes’ notion of hegemonic 
discourses discussed previously, which refers to something that has been deemed objective. 
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respectively the strategy employed to find meaning and the specific kind of meaning that will 
be analysed.   
  The outlined discourse theory incorporates notions from Bakhtin, Young, Fairclough 
and Laclau and Mouffe in a framework that can explain different aspects of discourses, rang-
ing from how implicit representations direct discourses to how different discourses struggle 
for the valid practice or description of an issue. The struggle also involves how the discourse 
frames issues and uses genres, which affect the rules that apply to the discourse, and how it is 
consumed and produced. How the discursive struggle unfolds relates to Fairclough’s concept 
of ‘order of discourse’, which combined with the security analysis of the Copenhagen school 
will be a structuring foundation of the forthcoming analysis. 
 The geopolitical framework comprises more than can be associated with the school of 
critical geopolitics. Foundational for the framework is the dialectical relationship between the 
geopolitical order and –discourse, which emphasizes the role of representational practices 
(‘pre-genres’) and geopolitical representations (visions and subjects) in reproducing and 
changing the geopolitical order. Connected to Nye’s three-dimensional chessboard of world 
politics, the geopolitical framework can explain how representations of the world influence 
geopolitical practices, and how the output interconnects with larger power structures. 
 I will in the following chapters analyse a specific order of discourse in which various 
discourses in different ways are involved in a discursive struggle about anti-Americanism and 
public diplomacy, called “public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era” (PDWTE). These 
‘discourses’ comprise networks of practices, utterances and opinions. Each discourse is based 
on a set of tales about the geopolitical threat and its consequences, and each has its own set of 
discursive resources (intertextual history and genres) and relative power to meet the threats. 
Together, these discourses shape the development of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era. I will now turn to how the research question can be operationalised for the analysis.  
 The main research question of this thesis is, as discussed in the introductory chapter, 
“What is the geopolitical rationale of American public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era?” This rationale will be explained through three interlinked aspects: “what geopolitical 
representations dominate this public diplomacy order of discourse,” “how do these representa-
tions manifest in public diplomacy efforts”, and “how does the discursive struggle affect the 
output of American public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era”? I will answer these ques-
tions through an analysis of the discursive struggle and a case. In chapter 5, I will categorise 
the discourses that dominate the PDWTE order of discourse, and analyse them according to 
each aspect. The first aspect will be explained through an analysis of the discourses’ underly-
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ing geopolitical representations, or definition of the situation, designation of relevant subjects 
and assessment of the threat. The second aspect will be explained through an analysis of the 
means and messages the diverging discourses use, and consider appropriate, to counter the 
geopolitical threat. To explain the third aspect, I will analyse how the different strategies 
struggling on the same arena affect the order of discourse, by assessing their relative power to 
define public diplomacy according to their representation of the geopolitical situation.  
 In chapter 6, I will analyse the public diplomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative 
(SVI) from 2002. First, I will analyse the campaign as a geopolitical discourse through how it 
communicates geopolitical representations and its role in a broader network of power. There-
after, I will discuss the debate that followed it in media, academia and public diplomacy cir-
cles, to analyse how the campaign represents the PDWTE order of discourse through what 
kinds of messages and methods are considered controversial or conventional. 
 But first, I will discuss the epistemological approach and analytical strategy of the the-
sis.

4  ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
 
A typical identity marker that distinguishes the discourse analysis from other analytical 
strategies in the social sciences is its approach to ontology and epistemology. Ontology is the 
study of the existence and seeks to describe the basic categories of being, and epistemology is 
the study of the nature and scope of knowledge. Contrary to other social scientists that mainly 
focus on ontology, a discourse analyst is less interested in the being than the becoming – how 
and why objects have come to appear the way they do (Neumann 2001). The object of analy-
sis in this thesis has been defined through a series of demarcations and a theoretical frame-
work comprising Critical geopolitics, Security analysis and various branches of discourse the-
ory. The discourse theory and the geopolitical framework constitute the two levels of the ana-
lytical strategy: respectively the strategy employed to find meaning and the specific kind of 
meaning that will be analysed. However, there has never been a clear distinction between the 
theoretical framework and analytical object. In this chapter, I will discuss how the philosophy 
of science, methodological approach and analytical strategy have contributed to shaping the 
analytical object and conclusions of this thesis, and evaluate the research. 
4.1 Philosophy of Science 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on a compound interpretation of post-
Marxist epistemology, which combines post-modern and Marxist approaches to power, 
knowledge and geography. 
 Postmodern post-Marxism (hereafter called post-Marxism11) is a theoretical amalga-
mation of two, in many ways, opposite epistemologies. Postmodernism refers in this context 
to the philosophy of science characterised by its fundamental critique of knowledge. While 
Marxism is a so-called ‘metanarrative’ that seeks to find the objective structures behind hu-
man interaction, postmodernism rejects the very notion of objectivity and claims that all 
knowledge is historically and culturally contingent. What postmodernism and Marxism have 
in common, however, is the deconstructive approach to knowledge and power. Although 
Marxism believes in objective structures, it indeed has a deconstructing tradition with notions 
                                                 
11 Several branches of Marxism can be labelled post-Marxist, such as Structural Marxism, neo-Marxism, the 
Frankfurt school and analytical Marxism, but in this text, the emphasis is on postmodern post-Marxism. 
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such as ideology, false consciousness and hegemony, which emphasise the power and situat-
edness of knowledge. A fundamental difference between the Marxist deconstructive episte-
mology and the post-modern is that Marxism inserts an alternative Truth where the post-
modern discourses mainly comment how the Truth is constructed. In post-Marxism, the rejec-
tion of the metanarrative is a matter of degree, from Laclau and Mouffes’ anti-essentialist ap-
proach to Fairclough’s emphasis on revealing discursive expressions of “real” economic 
power relations (Jørgensen and Philips 1999).  
 The epistemological value of geography can be incorporated into the post-Marxist 
framework. According to Henri Lefebvre (1991), the configuration of space is often taken to 
be objective, although spatial metaphors constitute a powerful form of reasoning in sciences 
and daily practices. In that sense, geography has a “naturalised” epistemology, embedded in 
our forms of reasoning. Before, during and after any spatial practice there is a discursive 
struggle about the configuration of space (Neumann 2001, 43). The post-Marxist aspect of 
this approach is the emphasis on deconstructing the power and modes of domination embed-
ded in geographic practices, and is central in the critical understanding of geopolitics. Post-
Marxist constructivism is also reflected in my methodological approach.   
4.2 Methodological Approach 
Political geography can be called a geo-sociological approach, which situates individuals and 
explains processes in social-geographical contexts (Agnew 1996). Unlike the disciplines of 
political science, sociology and economics, political geography demands a consideration of 
the spatial context in which a political process takes place, but at the same time, offers no spe-
cific methodology to measure spatial effects (O’Loughlin 2003, 35). There are advantages and 
disadvantages to employing approaches with little developed methodological framework. One 
advantage is that the approach allows for an exploring research strategy with space for crea-
tivity and for using interdisciplinary perspectives. A disadvantage, however, is that the use of 
approaches from other disciplines may seem less convincing when they are taken out of their 
original contexts. The intention of the theoretical approach of this thesis is to adapt such theo-
ries to a geo-sociological perspective rather than follow an already endorsed method. Al-
though the creative benefits of the approach may compensate for the benefits of a strong 
methodological and theoretical tradition, a central challenge remains: to unite epistemologi-
cally diverging theories into a coherent framework. 
 In order to harmonise Critical geopolitics, Security analysis, Fairclough’s critical dis-
course analysis and Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory, some conceptual translation is 
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necessary. Although all of these theories can be described as social constructivist, their epis-
temological foundations diverge: Laclau and Mouffes’ approach can be categorised as ‘ideal-
ist’ and the others ‘realist’. A principal difference between these approaches is that, where 
idealists merge epistemology with ontology, realists maintain this division. A problem with 
using the terms ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’ is the assumption that idealists reject the existence of 
a world external to thought: What they deny is rather that objects can constitute themselves as 
meaningful outside of a discursive context (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 108). An idealist would 
argue that, because our only access to the reality or materiality is through discourses, dis-
courses construct the social world. A realist would argue that although aspects of the social 
world are socially constructed; once they are constructed they become objective realities that 
affect and limit the possibilities for discourse (Fairclough 2003, 8). In other words, realists 
distinguish between discursive and social practices where idealists suggest that discourses, 
practices and identities all can be understood in terms of the same, discursive, logic. This in-
dicates a fundamental difference between the respective definitions of discourse: To idealists, 
discourse is a fixation of meaning in a broad sense, and to realists, it is a particular view on 
language, analysed in an abstract sense as “an element of social life”, or as particular dis-
courses (Fairclough 2003, 5).  
 The methodical implications of these two approaches are significant: Whether the dis-
course is regarded as the lingual element of social life or as the structuring totality of the so-
cial, determines the boundaries of the analytical object as well as its societal function. In the 
analysis, I will combine the two approaches in a particular way. I will follow Laclau and 
Mouffes’ definition of discourse as a fixation of meaning in a broad sense, and hence under-
stand also social practices and identities according to a discursive logic. When understood as 
such, what becomes noticeable is how institutional and methodical practices produce mean-
ing, and how they struggle for establishment. However; a theory that understands structures, 
discourses and agents in the same terms, leaves no “natural” space for understanding hierar-
chies between discourses and speakers, although such hierarchies can be understood indirectly 
as discursively constituted and hegemonised entities. To clarify these levels, I will analyti-
cally separate between discourse and practice, but use the discourse theory also to explain ‘ex-
tra-discursive’ entities, such as subjects and social practices.  
 In discourse analysis, the difference between theory and method is seen as artificial. 
Although discourse analysis is often referred to as a method, the concept’s genealogical origin 
is rather anti-method, because ‘method’ is frequently understood as a means to represent 
something from an external viewpoint. Because no such external viewpoint exists according 
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to discourse analysis, this approach to method is seen as unachievable and therefore inappro-
priate not only for discourse analysis, but for social sciences in general (Neumann 2001, 15). 
Any theory has methodical implications, and any method rests on some kind of theory. In-
stead, the notion ‘analytical strategies’ is employed to break down the hierarchy between the 
notions. I will now turn to the analytical strategy employed in this thesis. 
4.3 Analytical Strategy and -Process  
In constructivist research, neutrality is neither a possibility nor an ideal. The choices of theo-
ries, analytical strategies, research questions and empirical data determine the direction of the 
research process and hence the findings and conclusions. Throughout the research process, 
several choices, detours and reversals have shaped this thesis. The strategy applied can be la-
belled abductive reasoning, because the theory and data have been used in a dialectical fash-
ion. Abductive dialectics means that theory offers perspectives to guide the interpretation of 
data, and in the next turn, systematic empirical analyses contribute to the development of the-
ory, etc. (Thagaard 2003, 174). I have interchangeably used theory to highlight aspects of the 
empirical material, and the empirical data to show weaknesses of the theory. 
 It is often argued that the method or analytical strategy should be chosen according to 
its suitability for explaining an empirical phenomenon. I have not followed this advice nor do 
I believe it is customary to do so. Researchers usually have a theoretical or methodological 
preference that guides their choice of research material and research question. In the case of 
this thesis, my starting point was purely theoretical and emerged from an interest in popular 
geopolitics and discourse theory. I picked the case of American public diplomacy because it 
was a good example of popular geopolitics and an interesting study material for discourse 
analysis. My initial knowledge about American public diplomacy came from media studies, 
from scholars with a primarily critical focus on public diplomacy (See, for instance, Kamali-
pour 2004; Miller 2006; Snow 2002; 2003; Thussu 2005). After extensive reading, I turned to 
the literature from the public diplomacy culture to balance the image. What I found out after 
comparing media analyses of public diplomacy with public diplomacy literature12 was that a 
discourse analysis of any public diplomacy campaign would give a very simplified image of 
its rationale. The public diplomacy culture is a conflictual one, and characterised by many dif-
ferent approaches and intentions, which would not be captured by an analysis of one or some 
of its expressions. Indeed, a campaign can be an excellent study material for finding geopo-
litical representations, but the representations may not even be accepted within public diplo-
                                                 
12 The public diplomacy literature is extensive and includes weblogs, websites, reports, books and articles. 
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macy circles. To find out whether the geopolitical representations of such campaigns reflect 
the rationale of the public diplomacy culture, I decided to supplement the discourse analysis 
of campaigns with interviews with public diplomacy perpetrators and critics. The combination 
of research strategies is often called triangulation.  
 Traditionally, the purpose of triangulation in qualitative research has been to increase 
the validity of the results. The premise of validity is, if not contradictory to the purpose of 
qualitative research, certainly problematic in the episteme of postmodernism. For the purpose 
of validating findings, triangulation of methods carry the assumption “that there is a ‘fixed 
point’ or an ‘object’ that can be triangulated” (Richardson & St. Pierre 2005, 963). A post-
modernist deconstruction of triangulation would recognize that there are far more than “three 
sides” by which to approach the world. Richardson and St. Pierre suggest that replacing the 
notion triangulation with ‘crystallization’ deconstructs the idea of validity; “we feel how there 
is no single truth, and we see how texts validate themselves” (Ibid). Such an approach pro-
vides a deepened, complex, and thoroughly partial understanding of a topic, with space for 
doubt and for knowing that there is always more to know. I follow this critique of the notion 
of triangulation, but still find it a useful notion if its purpose can be redefined to finding new 
and more information on a topic. I have throughout the research process triangulated data, 
analytical strategies and theoretical approaches to produce a unique perspective.  
 There are advantages and disadvantages of studying a different culture. For an out-
sider, it can be easier to see congealed patterns and hegemonised ideas, but some nuances dis-
appear in the process. In order to balance the cultural handicap as an outsider, I have made 
extensive efforts to understand as much as possible from the American public diplomacy cul-
ture. Before the field trip to the US is January 2007, I spent a whole semester studying secon-
dary literature and find relevant interviewees. Because much of the literature about public di-
plomacy, anti-Americanism and the war on terrorism is brand new, I spent a week at the Brit-
ish Library in London for literature search. The preparation for the field trip included exten-
sive reading of blogs, articles, reports, books and official websites, studying accessible public 
diplomacy efforts and interviewing public diplomats at the American Embassy in Oslo. This 
process gave me some indication of what this “public diplomacy culture” is about, and helped 
me to choose relevant interviewees and a central case.  
 The analytical strategies applied have allowed a systematisation of a large amount of 
data and perspectives to be incorporated into the analysis. The subject under discussion is a 
chaotic field, partly because it is under contemporary development, and partly because the 
interests behind and purpose of public diplomacy are inherently contradictory. I do not wish 
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to diminish the complexity of the analytical “object”. Rather, the main challenge of this thesis 
has been to choose analytical perspectives and construct categories that simultaneously cap-
ture the complexity and keep a clear and steady focus. I will now turn to how these choices 
and constructions have been done.   
4.3.1 Analytical Operationalisation 
The research question of this thesis has been theoretically operationalised in chapter 3, but 
operational questions also emerge regarding the analytical strategy: How can a geopolitical 
rationale be analysed? How do I choose relevant data? How do I construct relevant demarca-
tions of theory and the analytical object, and of time and space?  
 The motivation and analytical demarcation of the research question is theoretical. A 
geopolitical rationale is a theoretical concept that must analytically construct its object of re-
search to make sense. There is no such “thing” as a geopolitical rationale or essential structure 
that imposes actions or thoughts on subjects. Neither does it make sense to simply ask the 
agents what the geopolitical rationale is behind their actions. Discourse analysis is well suited 
for this task, because it is designed to search for meaning: how textual or other practices are 
constructed upon assumptions about the world.  
 Another demarcation of the analytical object is the time frame under discussion, the 
“war on terrorism era”. This “era” is an analytical construct, although its time frame is widely 
accepted as relevant: from the terror attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) till today.13 I have 
set this time frame because 9/11 constituted a catalyst of the current public diplomacy era. 
This is not to suggest that the current public diplomacy era exclusively relates to the memory 
of 9/11, but the incident certainly marked a change in the discourse. Setting a time frame al-
ways involves an analytical demarcation, because no history has a “beginning”. Memories of 
the past and past discourses always contribute to shaping a discourse (Neumann, 2001). Pub-
lic diplomacy has a long tradition, and its rules, norms and conventions have developed 
through this process. The starting point of this time frame, however, is justifiable because it 
has initiated a cultural narration central to public diplomacy discourses. A greater challenge is 
the late ending point, because a number of public diplomacy practices have changed and new 
literature has emerged throughout my writing process. I have still chosen to follow this recent 
development because it gives a more comprehensive understanding of the direction public 
diplomacy has taken in this period.  
                                                 
13 Although this ”era” is still evolving, I discontinued the research after Karen Hughes resigned from her post as 
Under Secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs on 31. October 2007. 
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 The analytical object also includes a set of spatial demarcations. I have mainly focused 
on American public diplomacy in Muslim countries, because these are closer linked to the war 
on terrorism than, say, efforts towards the Norwegian audience. ‘Muslim countries’ does in 
this context not refer to places as such, but rather the construation of Muslim countries in the 
public diplomacy discourse. Because I wanted to study the rationale of public diplomacy 
rather than its effect, it was natural to choose the perpetrators rather than recipients as re-
search object. However, many public diplomats mainly work “in the field”, at embassies, TV-
networks, radio stations, publishing houses, etc., and do a smaller share of their work in the 
US. I still found that the State Department and other institutions in Washington DC were 
more appropriate as study object, because these are central in the development of the strategic 
direction of public diplomacy. For that reason, I chose the US as destination for my field trip.  
 A final demarcation concerns how I have chosen the analytical object. Two ap-
proaches have been employed to answer the research question: a study of a discursive struggle 
and a case study. These approaches require fundamentally different sets of demarcations: 
while the discursive struggle is analytically constructed, the case sets its own boundaries. 
 The American public diplomacy culture consists of a variety of conflict lines. If one 
were to ask different representatives for the public diplomacy culture what the main conflict 
lines were, different answers would emerge. However, an obvious pattern appeared from the 
interview material, which I have further construed with Security Analysis and discourse the-
ory as guidelines. A combination of theory and an empirical observation has thus contributed 
to the demarcation of the analytical object. This demarcation has also formed the categorisa-
tion of discourses and agents in the analysis of the discursive struggle.  
 A case study is a research strategy that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life 
context (Yin 2002). The empirical boundaries of the phenomenon determine the boundaries of 
the case. My approach to the case can be labelled instrumental. An instrumental case is one 
that is selected for its ability to demonstrate the phenomenon of interest, such as an under-
standing of an issue or refinement of theory. Although the case is studied in detail, it serves as 
a vehicle for the subject of interest (Stake 1995). I have chosen the controversial public di-
plomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002, which I have studied partly as a case 
and partly as a part of the discursive struggle. As a case, the campaign is interesting study ma-
terial as a display of geopolitical visions. As a part of the discursive struggle, it is interesting 
because it has been so much debated that a substantial amount of information about its pur-
pose and response is available. I have analysed the campaign as well as the interview data as 
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discursive practices because they, when regarded as such, give insight in the rationale of the 
public diplomacy culture.  
 I will now turn to how the sample of informants was selected, how the interviews were 
done and ethical issues concerning the interviews.  
4.3.2 Interviews  
In total fourteen people were interviewed for this thesis. It was fairly easy to find suitable in-
formants, and only a few of my interview requests were rejected. Because public diplomacy 
people work with information, they often participate in public debate in press and websites 
and are readily accessible through email. The basis upon which the informants were chosen 
varied: most of them were chosen due to the perspective of their writings in articles, books or 
reports; some were chosen with help from the State Department Press Office, and yet others 
were recommended by other interviewees. The sample of informants was chosen on the basis 
of already constructed categories, so-called quota sampling (Thagaard 2003, 55). These cate-
gories were ‘perpetrators’, ‘sideline critics,’ and ‘principal critics’, based on my impression of 
public diplomacy discourses from the consulted literature. The categories of critics can also 
be called ‘constructive’ and ‘deconstructive critics’, according to the nature of the critique. An 
early discovery in the interview process, however, was that each and every one of the inter-
viewees was critical, even the perpetrators, in both a constructive and deconstructive sense.  
 During the interviews, I also found that my initial knowledge about the public diplo-
macy culture was insufficient on some areas. I had decided to focus only on State Department 
(SD) public diplomacy because it appeared from the literature as the most central agent. What 
I found was that the public diplomacy culture is profoundly fragmented. I was aware of that a 
variety of schools and approaches exists among traditional public diplomats, but a more sig-
nificant division was much less noticed in the literature: a new agent had emerged as a public 
diplomacy perpetrator, the Department of Defense (DoD). After the field trip, more docu-
ments have been declassified and made publicly available about the involvement of the DoD 
in public diplomacy, but at the time, this information seemed to be less known and little de-
bated in the literature. This new knowledge caused me to categorize the information differ-
ently and focus on other conflict lines than the initial intention, which made the categories 
through which I had chosen interviewees in some ways obsolete. For that reason, I added 
more interviewees to the sample and slightly changed the focus of the interviews. Despite the 
rearrangement of categories; the broadness of the sample has been a great advantage due to 
the varied understanding of public diplomacy it has provided. 
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 A weakness of my data material is that the discursive struggle between SD and DoD is 
asymmetrically represented with a bias in favour of the SD. Nobody at the DoD was willing 
to be interviewed, only two of my interviewees had background from the DoD and only one 
of them was interested in defending that institution. This means that the discursive struggle is 
in the interviews represented partly from a SD point of view, partly from external viewpoints 
and only briefly from that of DoD. To balance the data bias, I have consulted DoD budgets, 
reports and articles that discuss the distribution of public diplomacy tasks between SD and 
DoD. The nature of information produced by interview data and reports, however, profoundly 
diverge, and hence the DoD appears more static and uniform. I have taken the consequence of 
the data bias by focusing in more depth on SD public diplomacy and how this camp relates to 
the DoD than the DoD practice per se.   
 The interviews produced almost twenty hours of taped material that was later tran-
scribed. I never intended to strictly compare the interviews, so I used the opportunity to try a 
variety of interview techniques. These techniques can all be labelled semi structured: “neither 
an open conversation nor a highly structured questionnaire” (Kvale 1996, 27). In some inter-
views, I asked only a few, broad questions and tried to direct the conversation according to 
the relevance of the information that came up. In others I asked more specific questions, and 
in a few cases I provoked a debate. Two of the interviews were group interviews, with two 
informants in each. None of the techniques turned out more favourably than others, and the 
difference between the data material it produced followed the lines of perspectives rather than 
the interview technique. The subject under discussion, however, was defined differently by 
each interviewee: the definition of public diplomacy evoked resolute, yet diverging, opinions. 
Because the main topic was subject to negotiation, the interviews were hard to predict, regard-
less of preparation. This relates to Haraway’s (1991) notions about situated knowledges. Be-
cause the interviewer and the interviewee have different situated knowledges, they can never 
fully understand each other. I must admit that I have knowingly used this occasion to get ac-
cess to both the interviewees and to information, which also poses an ethical question con-
cerning the interview process. 
4.3.2.1 Ethical Issues 
The central purpose of critical sciences is to reveal power structures, and hence the considera-
tion for ethical issues is regarded lighter when dealing with elites. Elites are usually capable 
of defending themselves through their defining power and access to media etc. While some of 
my informants certainly can be regarded as members of an elite, all of them were educated 
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and had some kind of professional background from the subject under discussion, and hence 
to some extent fall into the same category. The only use I have made of this reversed power 
structure is the amount of information I have shared about the project. Because some of the 
informants might become wary if they knew that the theoretical approach was critical geopoli-
tics, the project proposal attached to each interview request scarcely focused on the critical 
aspect.14 However, with only one exception, it did not seem to interest the interviewees for 
what purpose the information would be used.  
 Another ethical consideration concerning the interviews is the principle of confidenti-
ality (NESH 1993). I have chosen to keep my sources open since none of the interviewees ex-
pressed any wish to be treated anonymously. Because they were educated, accustomed to 
journalists and researchers, and no personal information was exchanged, I see no reason to 
believe that the lack of confidentiality could harm the informants. However, I have chosen to 
protect the sources in a few cases where the interview situation has been informal and allowed 
criticism that might look harsher in print. I will in the following section assess the research 
according to certain criteria, which includes the care for informants. 
4.4 Research Assessment  
Traditionally, social sciences have proposed standard criteria to determine the quality of a 
study. Reliability, validity and generalisation have been accepted as such criteria (Kvale 
1996). These notions have to some extent become rejected in social sciences, because they are 
formed on the premise from quantitative sciences that all knowledge is measurable. In a con-
structivist approach, these notions are also considered inappropriate because they reflect a 
philosophical presupposition that it is possible to achieve an objective or true knowledge 
about the world. Lincoln and Guba (1989) replace these notions with criteria that they argue 
better reflect the underlying assumptions involved in much qualitative research: credibility, 
confirmability and transferability.  
 One way of demonstrating the credibility of the research is to discuss the choices 
made throughout the research process, how the analytical object is constructed and analysed 
so that the reader can assess the choices made by the researcher (Dyrberg et.al. 2000). I have 
made extensive efforts to make the research transparent, by exposing the philosophical pre-
suppositions, theories and analytical strategies applied. However, the credibility criterion can 
also imply that the results of qualitative research are credible or believable from the perspec-
                                                 
14 The project proposal is listed in the appendix. 
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tive of the participant in the research.15 This can be described as an “empirical” approach to 
the criterion, because the participants do not necessarily recognise the theoretical notions ap-
plied and hence could feel alienated by the analysis. The interpretation of data also involves 
selection of data, which means that some participants would recognise more from the analysis 
than others. I have in the research focused on certain trends that have appeared as central from 
various sources, but if some of the participants would find these trends less relevant to how 
they perceive public diplomacy, it is understandable. This also relates to the criterion of con-
firmability, which refers to the extent to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated 
by others. All the aspects of public diplomacy I have focused on in this thesis are recognised 
by other literature. However, because the geopolitical perspective is a theoretical construct, it 
would only be corroborated by those who accept the premise of the theory. This also relates to 
the criterion of transferability, which refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative 
research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings. An appropriate ap-
proach for this study is from grounded theory: Blumer’s notion of ‘sensitizing concepts’. Sen-
sitizing concepts can be understood as “background ideas that inform the overall research 
problem” (Charmaz 2003). The kind of transferability this approach advocates, is thus to re-
gard the findings of one analysis as starting points for another. This thesis advocates a per-
spective that could be used in other studies to highlight the geopolitical assumptions that 
structure our everyday practices. In order for such a perspective to be established in the social 
sciences, it should be transferred to other analyses: it should be repeatedly tried, developed 
and debated. In the last resort, the credibility of a perspective rests on its recognition by the 
research community.  
 I will now turn to the actual analysis: What is the geopolitical rationale of public di-
plomacy in the war on terrorism era? 
 
15 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualval.php 

5  THE GEOPOLITICAL RATIONALE  
 
The concept of ‘geopolitical rationale’ of American public diplomacy requires differentiation; 
as a singular rationale representing the practice does not exist. It is rather subject to discursive 
struggle, advocated by different agents. In this chapter, the geopolitical rationale will be ana-
lysed through a classification of discourses that struggle for the definition of the geopolitical 
situation, so-called geopolitical discourses. These discourses constitute an order of discourse 
described as “public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era” (PDWTE). Although the current 
public diplomacy era involves more than can be related to the war on terrorism, this geopoliti-
cal situation has such a structuring impact on public diplomacy that it has produced a distinct 
order of discourse. The forthcoming analysis will be structured around the central public di-
plomacy discourses in this order of discourse, which I have classified as ‘politicized’, ‘securi-
tized’ and ‘marketized’. This specific categorisation pinpoints how the diverging interpreta-
tions of the geopolitical threat have contributed to fragmenting the development of public di-
plomacy in the war on terrorism era. I will use the categories to deconstruct this process by 
analysing how the geopolitical visions of the order of discourse designates responsible institu-
tions and forms the methods and messages of public diplomacy; how the respective discourses 
have developed since 9/11, and how the inherent differences between, and power of, the dis-
courses affect the output of American public diplomacy in this era.  
 The principal geopolitical threat structuring this order of discourse is anti-
Americanism. However, the threat of anti-Americanism has different implications in different 
discourses about public diplomacy. A discourse that understands anti-Americanism as a threat 
to US soft power can be characterised as politicized, because it situates the geopolitical threat 
in a political game of power. In such a discourse, public diplomacy is regarded as a tool to 
turn the worldwide negative attitudes towards the US that particularly mushroomed following 
the US-led war on terrorism and the Iraq war. Since the decline of soft power cannot be coun-
tered with unattractive means, this discourse often advocates enhancing and/or communicat-
ing the resources that makes the US attractive, such as democratic values like freedom of ex-
pression.  
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 Declining soft power can also constitute a security threat, because it makes the US 
more vulnerable to attacks and weakens its ability to build international alliances necessary 
for military actions. However, when anti-Americanism is regarded principally as a security 
threat, it produces a discourse characterized as securitized. Because security prevails over 
other interests in this discourse, the means to counter the threat are not obliged to consider the 
potential loss of soft power. Hence, the securitized discourse has the opportunity to employ 
more diverse means for public diplomacy and other information strategies. 
  Anti-Americanism is in some discourses principally regarded as an economic issue 
that affects the competitiveness of the US and American firms abroad. This approach can fo-
cus on threats to the trade security as well as marketing power, and the discourse it produces 
can be characterised as marketized. Examples of such threats are potential trade barriers, 
commodity boycotts, declining brand value, etc. Different processes can be described as mar-
ketization of public diplomacy. One such process involves that public diplomacy activities are 
being outsourced to private actors, on the initiative of governmental institutions or the private 
sector. Another involves that market logic, with discourses and genres associated with the pri-
vate sector, are increasingly diffusing into the public diplomacy sphere. Both processes result 
in a change of the number and variety of agents and methods of public diplomacy.   
 A final set of discourses in the PDWTE order of discourse that is worth mentioning is 
critical discourses that approach the threat of anti-Americanism mainly by its cause, and argue 
that the cause is American foreign policy. These focus on the unethical aspects of public di-
plomacy, whether it relates to the use of propagandistic methods or cultural imperialism. Be-
cause these discourses usually stay outside boundaries of the practicing public diplomacy 
sphere, they have less influence on the development of the PDWTE order of discourse. There-
fore, they will only briefly be discussed in this thesis. 
 Discourse analyses can be at risk of becoming vague and inefficient when they avoid 
grounding the discourses in institutions or other tangible spaces. Although the discourses un-
der discussion often cross institutional boundaries, it is useful to identify their institutional 
foundations, because different institutions are designed to target different threats and hence 
interpret the situation according to their mandate. I will mainly focus on securitized and poli-
ticized public diplomacy discourses, but a secondary perspective is how the marketized dis-
courses contribute to shaping the other discourses.  
 As discussed in chapter 2, there exist a variety of institutions that in one way of an-
other are involved in public diplomacy activities. Central institutions are State Department 
(SD), Office of Global Communications and Broadcasting Board of Governors. Somewhat 
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less acknowledged until recently, is the involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
public diplomacy activities. Other institutions could be listed, but I will limit this analysis to 
SD and DoD. Which institution performs which tasks of public diplomacy is significant be-
cause the institutions largely base their practices on different discourses. Of course; because 
the categorisation is analytically essentialised, there will always be exceptions. The categories 
‘securitized’ and ‘politicized’ discourses to some extent correspond with the respective insti-
tutions’ approach to public diplomacy; DoD employing securitized discourses and SD politi-
cized. As I will come back to, this pattern is partly shifting because the SD discourse is in-
creasingly influenced by the securitized discourse of DoD and the Bush administration.  
 During the interviews with SD people, former diplomats and external critics, an initial 
impression was that they all were familiar with public diplomacy being a conflictual field, and 
a central struggle being between SD and DoD. A representative for the public diplomacy cul-
ture attributes the struggle to what he calls tribal cultures.  
 
“Public diplomacy has tribal cultures. Diplomats are a tribal culture; the military can be 
seen as a tribal culture. […] The people who do democratisation are a tribal culture; the 
people whodo cultural exchange are a tribal culture. They don’t talk to each other! 
They want to defend their budget, they want to, ‘the way I approach this is really the 
answer and you military folks don’t know what you’re talking about’” (Gregory, Inter-
view 2.3.2007). 
 
This description is typical of the State Department public diplomacy discourse. On the one 
hand, public diplomats are almost invariably critical to DoD methods, but on the other, the 
polyphonic presence of the DoD public diplomacy discourse witnessed an exchange between 
the discourses. The notion of polyphony is useful here to point out the influence of the DoD 
on the SD discourse without being present.  
 Before I turn to how the politicized and securitized trends shape specific practices and 
discourses, I will analyse how the geopolitical representation of anti-Americanism direct the 
respective discourses. 
5.1 The Geopolitical Premise of Public Diplomacy Discourses  
The idea of anti-Americanism is essentially geopolitical because it represents a power struc-
ture by which the US in one way or another is threatened by the outside world. Polls about 
anti-Americanism are omnipresent in contemporary literature about public diplomacy, be it 
“insider” or critical literature (See, for instance, Rugh 2006; Lynch 2006;  Lord 2006; Stauber 
& Rampton 2006; Nye 2004; Telhami 2002; Satloff 2004; Djerejian 2003; Zogby 2002, etc.), 
and the polls were frequently referred to by my interviewees. The idea that anti-Americanism 
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both shapes the information climate and necessitates public diplomacy is hegemonic in the 
securitized, politicized and marketized discourses. Alternative ideas about anti-Americanism 
and public diplomacy are still available: for instance, it can be claimed that anti-Americanism 
can only be countered by policy change or that public diplomacy can only have an impact if 
the audience already sympathises with the message. These ideas exist in critical discourses, 
but seem to have little influence in the PDWTE order of discourse. An observation from my 
interviews with public diplomacy critics is that the argument that public diplomacy can not 
alter anti-Americanism is not consistently formulated. A typical example: 
 
“The reason why there’s anti-Americanism in the world is because people don’t like 
the product, it’s not because it’s not being sold well. That’s the basic flaw in the whole 
publicdiplomacy industry. […] Having said that, of course, it’s possible and important 
for the US to do a much better job at public diplomacy (Toensing, interview 
26.2.2007).  
 
The articulation seems to be representative for critical discourses: The speakers argue that 
policy change is necessary to turn the unfavourable opinion, yet request typical public diplo-
macy elements in the process, such as language skills, dialogue and cultural sensitivity. 
Therefore, I partly include critical discourses when I argue that there is a broad agreement in 
the PDWTE order of discourse that the challenge of anti-Americanism is a responsibility of 
public diplomacy.  
 What the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism means, on the other hand, is differ-
ently defined in the securitized, marketized and politicized discourses. I will briefly present 
some polls about global (especially Muslim) attitudes towards the US, before I discuss how 
the discourses in the PDWTE order of discourse relate to these statistics.  
 Since 9/11, tracking public opinion has become a widespread enterprise, and various 
institutions such as the Pew Global Attitudes Project and Zogby International are involved in 
surveys. The polls show a worldwide trend of plunging opinions towards the US (Kohut 
2007).16 The negative opinions are clearly strongest in Muslim countries, although there has 
been a slight improvement in some countries since the negative peak following the Iraq war. 
Moreover, with the Iraq war, anti-Americanism spread to Muslim countries where the U.S. 
had previously been relatively popular. Polls show that many in Muslim countries began to 
see the U.S. as a threat to Islam after the Iraq war. A 2005 Pew study found that in all five 
                                                 
16 All the statistics in this section are from the same report (Kohut 2007), which can be retrieved at 
http://pewglobal.org/commentary/pdf/1019.pdf.  The reason for choosing this particular report is because it 
shows a longer time frame and includes newer figures than most similar reports, and it compares the public opin-
ion in relatively many countries.  
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majority Muslim countries surveyed, solid majorities said they worried that the U.S. might 
become a military threat to their country. In 2006, a poll showed that majorities in Jordan, 
Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan believe the war has made the world a more dangerous 
place. The war on terrorism is also perceived quite negatively throughout much of the Muslim 
world, and the support for American anti-terrorism efforts are declining in many parts of the 
globe. An important reason appears to be that people distrust the US’ motives. In a 2004 Pew 
poll, majorities in seven of the nine countries surveyed said the war on terrorism was not 
really a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism. Suspected motives were “to control 
Mideast oil”, “to dominate the world”, “to target unfriendly Muslim governments” and “to 
protect Israel”. A more optimistic finding is that the polls show a significant improvement in 
Indonesian public attitude towards the US after the 2004 tsunami relief efforts. This example 
is also frequently used in public diplomacy literature as a proof that public diplomacy together 
with aid can turn unfavourable opinions.  
 The Pew opinion surveys include several more findings of reasons for the US’ declin-
ing popularity, and most of them relate to US foreign policy. Because there is an agreement 
that these polls are relevant for public diplomacy, they are interesting for this study as a tale 
the Storyrealm of public diplomacy discourses relate to: The geopolitical threat of anti-
Americanism is the source of the reinvigoration of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era.  
 Although the consequences of the US’ declining standing are construed differently in 
securitized, marketized and politicized discourses, the polls are uniformly interpreted with the 
notion ‘anti-Americanism’. The hegemony of this notion is interesting, not because it neces-
sarily is an inappropriate term, but because it constitutes a central premise throughout the 
PDWTE order of discourse that none of the conflicting discourses seem to question. In con-
trast, there exists no such notion as ‘anti-Norwegianism’ despite of the incendiary bombing of 
the Norwegian embassy in Syria in 2006, or the foreign disapproval of Norway’s involvement 
in controversial industries such as whaling.  
 The hegemony of the notion of anti-Americanism is rather new in the public diplo-
macy discourse. During the Cold War, public diplomacy discourses usually presupposed that 
the audience sympathized with the US because the threat of the Soviet Union was taken to be 
the worse alternative. It was only after 9/11 the notion of anti-Americanism came to structure 
the public diplomacy discourse, although the US’ declining popularity already was a concern 
in the SD in early 2001 (Fullerton and Kendrick 2006). 
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 Before I turn to what premise anti-Americanism forms for the various discourses, a 
short reminder of Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory is in place. A discourse is established 
around certain nodal points, which constitute a structuring element that other signs are estab-
lished in relation to. These other signs are categorised as elements and moments, the former 
referring to floating signifiers and the latter to signs with a fixed meaning in the discourse. In 
the PDWTE order of discourse, the signs ‘anti-Americanism’ and ‘security’ are central in all 
the discourses, but their meanings change according to the discourse.  
 In the marketized discourse, an economic rationale constitutes the nodal point. Anti-
Americanism can be seen as a moment because its meaning is fixed as an economic threat and 
hence constitutes the rationale for engaging in public diplomacy. Security can be seen as an 
element because the rather vague idea that anti-Americanism can affect the competitiveness 
and trade security of American firms has made private actors interested in public diplomacy. 
However, it merely constitutes one of various factors, and neither is it clear what security 
means for the specific actor nor is it necessarily the source of the interest. 
 In the securitized discourse, security constitutes the nodal point because all the ele-
ments and moments in the discourse are structured in relation to it. Anti-Americanism is a 
fixed moment in the discourse. It is uniformly perceived as a security threat, often as an exis-
tential threat against both the American people and territory through terrorism and against 
American ideology through radical Islamism. Although there are securitized elements to SD 
public diplomacy, a “purer” expression of securitized public diplomacy can be identified in 
the Department of Defense (DoD) approach. The DoD standing body for coordination of stra-
tegic communication (one of which public diplomacy), the Strategic Communication Integra-
tion Group (SCIG), has two priorities approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. These 
are to “Educate coalition and domestic audiences on Iraq strategy”, and to “Counter al-Qaeda 
and Taliban in Afghanistan” (Wells 2007, 4). In other words, the strategy is broader in the 
sense that it comprises foreign and domestic audiences, but the goal is narrowed down to the 
war on terrorism and the war on Iraq. Due to the narrow goal, the DoD has no other matters to 
balance, and hence, security has a structuring impact on all other interests.  
 In a politicized discourse, the notion of security is a moment because it has a specific 
meaning yet balances the threat with other factors at risk. The SD Director for Public Diplo-
macy for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Alberto Fernandez, attributed this to a broader 
definition of what is at stake in the war on terrorism. 
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“Everything we do has a cost beyond the cost of the thing itself. […] Guantanamo has 
other costs to it. It has a social cost, a political cost, a moral cost, it costs you in that 
critical mass of goodwill, of a good view of the US that people have, they may be real 
or not”  (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007).  
 
This critical mass of goodwill, which can be described with Nye’s notion of ‘soft power’, re-
lates to any issue where influence requires other or more assets than military or economic 
power. Such spheres of influence range from trade to diplomacy and popular culture. The 
nodal point in the politicized discourse is thus soft power, and its role for countering terrorism 
exemplifies where this discourse diverges form the securitized. Typical of the politicized dis-
course is the argument that the US in the war on terrorism has relied too much on the wrong 
assets.   
 
“The problem is that Islamist motivated extremism that is manifested in terrorism, is 
not overwhelmingly military or security or intelligence related. It’s an intellectual is-
sue, an ideological issue. It built up over time by certain trends of jihadi Islam being 
perverted or channelled to violent extremes. It is something that is manifested by ter-
rorism, but it did not become that over time by violence. It became what it  be-
came over time in schools, in  universities, in the media, on the Internet, in publica-
tions, and we [the US] have hardly addressed that side of the problem” (Fernandez, 
SD, interview 28.2.2007).  
 
The claim that the disregard for root causes in the war on terrorism may have increased the 
terror threat is typical of a politicized approach. Security and terrorism are thus central mo-
ments, but because these are structured around the nodal point ‘soft power’, security attains a 
different meaning. The notion of anti-Americanism constitutes an element in the discourse, 
however central, because it has a floating meaning: it variably refers to the terror threat and 
the general loss of soft power, particularly following the war on terrorism. This dilemma re-
sembles Nye’s theory of world politics as a “three-dimensional chess game”: the war on ter-
rorism works in interplay with other games of power. In this three-dimensional game, mili-
tary, economic and transnational issues must be coordinated, and different power resources 
must be judged according to their contexts. In order to succeed in the three-dimensional game, 
perceptions must be taken into account and the possible cost of soft power must be balanced 
against other actions. 
 A foundational split in the PDWTE order of discourse is which geopolitical vision 
anti-Americanism is associated with. The premise that anti-Americanism constitutes a secu-
rity threat exists in each discourse, but it does not necessarily securitize the discourse. The 
sign ‘security’ constitutes a nodal point in the securitized discourse, a moment in the politi-
cized discourse and an element in the marketized discourse. In practice, this means that ‘secu-
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rity’ is imperative to the securitized discourse, has a specific meaning to the politicized and 
exists as a notion to the marketized discourse. The structure of the discourses can be summa-
rised as follows: 
 Securitized Politicized Marketized 
Nodal point Security threat Soft power threat Economic threat 
Moment Anti-Americanism Security threat Anti-Americanism 
Element - Anti-Americanism Security threat 
Figure 5.1: The geopolitical premise of the different discourses 
 
The implication of these differences relate to how the security threat is defined, how the solu-
tion is prescribed and whether this solution prevails or is balanced against other costs. It is 
thus the respective nodal points of the discourses that determine what kind of geopolitical 
threat anti-Americanism constitutes and what considerations that should be taken into account 
for countering it. In a securitized discourse, anti-Americanism represents a security threat that 
must be countered; in a politicized it represents a decline of soft power that must be won 
back. These considerations, in turn, shape the discourses’ guidelines, or “rules”, for public 
diplomacy.  
5.2 The Rules of Public Diplomacy in the Various Discourses 
An initial impression during the interview process was that there exists a discursive struggle 
about the practice of public diplomacy in the PDWTE order of discourse. This discursive 
struggle is about the rules of the game: which methods of public diplomacy and strategic 
communication are appropriate, strategically clever or even legal. These “rules” of public di-
plomacy can be called features of the geopolitical order, because they refer to institutionalised 
patterns that enable geopolitical discourses.  
 The rules of the discourses are not only based on the understanding of anti-
Americanism, they have been produced through the different intertextual histories of the dis-
courses. Because the marketized and securitized discourses are “new” challengers to the more 
traditional politicized discourse, they have diverging functions in the PDWTE order of dis-
course. In the recent years, public diplomacy has been heavily debated in news media; blogs, 
articles and books, and some 30 reports have been produced to advise the US government 
about the strategic direction of public diplomacy. This debate is interesting because it reveals 
how different rules apply to public diplomacy according to which geopolitical threat it is des-
ignated to target: whether the threat of anti-Americanism is based on the rationale of security, 
economics or soft power. I will discuss how the respective discourses have affected the rules 
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of public diplomacy in separate paragraphs: the marketized and the politicized discourses in 
the SD, and the securitized in SD and DoD.  
5.2.1 Marketized Public Diplomacy  
Marketization of public diplomacy in the SD has manifested in different expressions. Two 
distinct periods have characterised the SD discourse since 9/11: Charlotte Beers’ era from Oc-
tober 2001 to March 2003 and Karen Hughes’ era from July 2005 to October 2007.17 A com-
parison of Beers’ and Hughes’ practices of is interesting because their respective approaches 
have left such different footprints on the public diplomacy discourse. The different receptions 
of Beers’ and Hughes’ approaches in public diplomacy circles give insight in broader tenden-
cies in the discourse.  
The appointment of the former advertising executive Charlotte Beers as Under Secre-
tary for public diplomacy and public affairs in 2001 illustrated the influence of the marketized 
discourse, but it also marked its limitations. 
 Months before Beers was sworn in, then Secretary of State Colin Powell told a House 
Budget Committee that the SD would bring “people into the public diplomacy function who 
are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA way to really branding foreign pol-
icy, branding the department, […] marketing American values to the world” (Fullerton and 
Kendrick 2006, 20). The marketing-discourse was drawn directly from Beers, who later intro-
duced the situated genre of advertising in public diplomacy. The introduction of the advertis-
ing genre in the SD public diplomacy discourse is well described by Fairclough’s notion of 
marketization, referring to market logic diffusing into areas where other discourses previously 
have dominated. Fairclough uses this notion to describe societal change. In this case, the mar-
ketization process did not produce a permanent change. It rather caused a major debate from 
its introduction, and the method of advertising was accused of being unethical on the one 
hand and counterproductive on the other. The advertising strategy has been advocated by 
some, like the prominent Djerejian report (2003), but the discourse has not taken hold in the 
SD. State Department officials have rather distinguished themselves from Charlotte Beers and 
the advertising strategy. The reluctance to accept the marketized discourse in the SD is also an 
example of the context-dependency of Fairclough’s notion, which often appears as if it de-
scribes a process without an exit.  
                                                 
17 Between March 2003 and July 2005, the position as Under Secretary was occupied for only six months be-
tween December 2003 and June 2004 by Margaret Tutwiler, former ambassador to Morocco, and for the rest 
remained vacant.  
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 After Beers’ resignation, the SD internally chose to push back on the marketized dis-
course. Still, it is involved in a different marketization process by encouraging businesses to 
engage in public diplomacy.18 Karen Hughes underlined the role of the private sector in her 
first testimony as Under Secretary before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2005. 
Under the heading “the Mission of Public Diplomacy”, she claimed that, “We […] must de-
velop effective ways to marshal the great creativity of our private sector […] because I be-
lieve this engagement is critical to our success” (Hughes 2005). Sheldon Rampton at the Cen-
ter for Media and Democracy explained this tendency with the businesses’ more differentiated 
means for public diplomacy: Businesses can reach into foreign cultures in ways the govern-
ment does not, like consumption, and have fewer legal restraints. The businesses’ motivation 
for engaging in public diplomacy activities, Rampton argued, is that they are concerned that 
the declining American reputation abroad affects their ability to do business, and they believe 
that they can do a better job than the government (Rampton, interview 12.2.2007). 
 The marketization process of the SD discourse in Karen Hughes’ era was substantially 
different than that of Charlotte Beers. On the one hand, the increase of agents performing pub-
lic diplomacy efforts without leaving government fingerprints makes more differentiated ef-
forts possible. On the other hand, because other agents take on some of this work, the SD pub-
lic diplomacy discourse can sway away from the marketized discourse and focus on democ-
ratic ideals, which are seen as less controversial as governmental public diplomacy activities. 
This subtle marketizing process thus simultaneously leads to a politicization of SD public di-
plomacy.  
5.2.2 Politicized Public Diplomacy  
Since Karen Hughes entered office, process issues have been reversed and transformed in the 
State Department. During her first testimony, “the Mission of Public Diplomacy” 
(22.06.2005), Hughes described her approach to public diplomacy in the war on terrorism, 
which was clearly influenced by the premise of soft power:  
 
“In the long run, the way to prevail in this battle [of ideas] is through the power of our 
ideals; for they speak to all of us, every people in every land on every continent. Given 
a fair hearing, I am sure they will prevail. […] Our adversaries resort to propaganda, 
myths, intimidation and control because they don’t want people to decide for them-
selves. In contrast, we want to create the connections and conditions that allow people 
to make up their own minds, because we are confident that given a fair hearing and a 
                                                 
18 The involvement of the private sector is not new in public diplomacy, but the past years it has become a cen-
tral issue in public diplomacy discourses.  
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free choice, people will choose freedom over tyranny and tolerance over extremism 
every time.” 
 
The emphasis on attractive power situates the articulation in a politicized discourse, which in 
the next turn affects the strategic direction and selection of methods to target the geopolitical 
threat. To accomplish the mission of public diplomacy, Karen Hughes outlined four strategic 
pillars for public diplomacy in the war on terrorism, “the four E’s”: engagement, exchanges, 
education and empowerment. ‘Engagement’ refers to the advocacy of American ideas and 
rapid response to “confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous myths, and get out the truth” 
(Hughes 22.06.2005). ‘Exchanges’ means giving more people the opportunity to live, work 
and study in the US, so that they “can learn for themselves that Americans are generous, hard-
working people who value faith and family” (Ibid). ‘Education’ refers both to enhancing 
Americans’ knowledge about the world and offering English language training programs in 
foreign countries. ‘Empowerment’ involves advocating participation for women, and helping 
those who share American values. Another notion that public diplomacy people associate with 
Karen Hughes is ‘dialogue’. The strategic pillars and the dialogic ideal appear to be widely 
embraced by public diplomats. What Hughes has often been criticized for is that she does not 
always herself follow her ideals: she is rather infamous for talking more than she listens, and 
for not being sensitive to cultural differences when she is advocating ‘universal ideals’.  
 Hughes’ selection of methods reflects the politicized discourse: they are balanced 
against other potential costs. Since 9/11 and following the war on terrorism, it has been re-
ported that American public diplomacy efforts have been received as propaganda and at-
tempts to control foreign public opinion. Examples of controversial efforts are the advertising 
campaign Shared Value Initiative, Hi Magazine and the television channel Al Hurra. It seems 
that the image as a propagandist that followed these efforts has been taken seriously, because 
Karen Hughes and the SD have either abandoned or started to relate differently to the contro-
versial public diplomacy efforts. Only a few months after Hughes entered office, Hi Magazine 
was suspended. The SD started more or less to distance itself from Al Hurra, which is a prod-
uct of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Instead of talking on Al Hurra, Hughes and pub-
lic diplomats chose to show up on Arabic media like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, which have 
larger audiences and higher credibility among Muslims.  
 Not only has Karen Hughes reversed unpopular public diplomacy efforts, new meth-
ods have been introduced. A priority under the strategic pillar ‘engagement’ is the Rapid Re-
sponse Unit, which provides extensive monitoring of foreign media. The purpose is to keep 
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track of misinformation and criticism of American policies and actions, and provide guide-
lines for synchronic response to public diplomats in the field. The Rapid Response Unit aims 
to restore the US’ credibility, which is seen to have been undermined by the contradictory 
messages in the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq. Process efforts have also been set in 
place to weaken the negative image of the SD as an information-controlling institution, like 
giving ambassadors freer reins to give speeches without having to clear them with the SD 
first. 
 The strategic pillars ‘empowerment’ and ‘education’ underline the focus on root 
causes of anti-Americanism and terrorism, which is also a typical feature of the politicized 
discourse. A central project of the SD is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which 
was launched by President George W. Bush in 2002. Through more than 350 programs, MEPI 
supports indigenous organizations in the Middle East that are working to bring about struc-
tural and institutional reform in their own countries. The project addresses the following “ob-
stacles” to development: political governance and participation, economic liberalization and 
opportunity, educational quality and access, and the empowerment of women. Karen Hughes 
has spent much effort on outreach tours to inform Middle Eastern audiences about MEPI and 
US aid. 
 Another aspect that situates the SD public diplomacy in a politicized discourse is the 
designation of the target audience. The target audience is people throughout the whole world 
(except in the US), not merely people in strategically important areas such as the Middle East. 
As illustrated by Nye’s metaphorical three-dimensional chessboard of world politics, each 
game of power must be played simultaneously to succeed in military, economic or transna-
tional issues. Not only Middle Eastern audiences, but also others like the European, have 
strong opinions about American actions in the war on terrorism, including information pro-
grams. A reason for marking a distance from propagandistic methods is the negative impact it 
has had on the public opinion throughout the world, including Europe. The use of propaganda 
in the war on terrorism has signalled that the US is abandoning its own ideals about freedom 
of expression and democracy, which renders the US less attractive to cooperate with for 
Europeans. Although several public diplomacy programs designated for Europeans exist, I 
have limited the analysis to efforts specifically directed to Muslim audiences. 
 A superficial comparison of the public diplomacy approaches of Charlotte Beers and 
Karen Hughes gives impression that the change is radical. Indeed, the change of approach is 
substantial, but it is important to note that the politicized part of Hughes’ approach resembles 
much traditional public diplomacy, which was performed during Beers’ era as well. Ex-
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changes and outreach tours, for instance, have been central strategies all along; the difference 
is the degree of priority. Neither were any of the Under Secretaries dictators of the public dip-
lomats in the SD or in the field: experienced employees have ensured a continuance of tradi-
tional practices.  
 The significance of comparing the two eras is that the impact of the respective ap-
proaches to public diplomacy reveals how the geopolitical situation is defined and solution 
prescribed in the State Department. Whether a method is embraced or rejected depends on 
how the discourse defines its purpose. In public diplomacy circles, Karen Hughes’ ideals and 
methods seem to have been embraced and those introduced by Charlotte Beers largely re-
jected.19 However, Karen Hughes’ purpose of public diplomacy appears to have been contra-
dictory: it appears to have juggled soft power with a narrower, securitized approach. 
5.2.3 Securitized public diplomacy     
The SD and the DoD have different roles in securitizing public diplomacy. In the SD, Karen 
Hughes started to regard public diplomacy as a security priority and hence strengthened its 
position. Simultaneously, tasks have been shifted from the SD to the DoD where other tradi-
tions and rules shape the discourse. It appears that Karen Hughes has had a firm hand in shift-
ing the responsibility of public diplomacy. 
 In her departure press conference on 31.October 2007, Karen Hughes stated the link 
between public diplomacy and security. “I feel that I have done what Secretary Rice and 
President Bush asked me to do by transforming public diplomacy and making it a national 
security priority central to everything we do in government.” According to public diplomats, 
the coordination process must have started after Donald Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert 
Gates as Secretary of Defense in December 2006, because Rumsfeld was not concerned with 
the “hearts and minds-issues” (Rugh, interview 26.2.2007).  
 In the past years, a number of articles in the US press have reported that political and 
military leaders are frustrated because the government does not have an integrated process for 
strategic communication in the war on terrorism. According to Brigadier General Eder in the 
U.S. Army, this frustration has been vented toward the DoD and the military services (Eder 
2007). To counter the problem of unsynchronised information, Karen Hughes started a proc-
ess for closer coordination and integration among various government agencies dealing with 
                                                 
19 The rejection of Charlotte Beers’ methods is somewhat overstated, but the nuances of this argument will be 
analysed in chapter 6. 
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public information. The process of associating public diplomacy more with strategic commu-
nication, Eder argues, is transforming the way SD works (Eder 2007).  
 There are clear and distinct rules for governmental public diplomacy in the US. Since 
the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 banned the government from propagandizing domestic audi-
ence, there has been a practice of distinguishing formally between public diplomacy and pub-
lic affairs. What distinguishes strategic communication from “the old stovepiped way of doing 
business”, according to Eder, is “formal cooperation among communicators” (Eder 63, 2007). 
In order to avoid mixed messages in the war on terrorism, a process of coordination between 
strategic actors has been initiated, which blurs the distinction between public diplomacy, pub-
lic affairs and other strategic communication. This transformation is caused by the entrance of 
a securitized discourse in the SD: the purpose has been narrowed down to target the security 
threat of anti-Americanism. The exchange between the discourses can be explained with the 
notion interdiscursivity, which describes how borders between discourses move when fixed 
moments from one discourse enters another. In the politicized discourse, attempts to fix the 
meaning of ‘security’ in a narrow sense are gradually challenging the discourse. However, the 
controversy of the coordinating process indicates that the rule has yet to become conventional 
in the discourse.  
 A reason for the controversy among SD public diplomats to cooperate with the DoD 
on public diplomacy is that the respective institutions have different motives and methods. In 
the DoD discourse, the main challenges public diplomacy is designated to solve, is the infor-
mation problem in the war on terrorism, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The special na-
ture of security enables discourses relying on its premise to justify extraordinary means to 
counter the threat. As the DoD motivation for engaging in public diplomacy is exclusively 
defined in terms of security, more diverse methods are considered legitimate. The overarching 
principle to deal with the problem is strategic communication, which aims to achieve specific 
goals with fewer restraints on the means. A public diplomacy officer who recently served in 
Iraq, Richard Schmierer, explained the military information effort as a more differentiated 
approach. People at the SD, he argued, have certain guidelines appropriate for their purpose. 
Because the SD does not per se fight wars, the information activities have to be completely 
transparent, credible and truthful. The same guidelines apply to DoD regular public affairs 
operations, but not necessarily to information operations for tactical purposes, and tactical 
warfare. Such information operations include paying local newspapers for publishing infor-
mation without revealing the source. This information, Schmierer argued, must be truthful, 
but paint a helpful picture, like when a new school has been opened, the road has been paved, 
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or a clinic has been built. Tactical warfare can include untrue information, such as planting 
the word on the street that the US military has planted a spy in an enemy organisation to dis-
tract the enemy (Schmierer, interview 2.3.2007).  
 The fact that the DoD and the military’s methods have not been saved from contro-
versy clarifies some of their public diplomacy regulations. When DoD practice of buying me-
dia space for favourable information through Lincoln Group was revealed by LA Times in 
November 2005, it caused a heated debate in American and European press. According to a 
public diplomat to the Middle East, the DoD and White House also reacted negatively on the 
practice, but the practice of using Lincoln Group was never changed (Rugh, interview 
26.2.2007). After an internal investigation, the DoD concluded officially that the practice was 
within their mandate (NTB 20.10. 2006). In comparison, the SD employed a similar technique 
with the mentioned campaign Shared Values Initiative in 2002, which I will analyse in chap-
ter 6. Similar to the Lincoln Group practice, a root criticism of the campaign was that the SD 
covered the source. However, the SD did not conclude  that the practice was within their 
mandate, but rather marked a distance from it. This comparison exemplifies how different 
rules apply to the SD and DoD public diplomacy discourses. 
5.2.4 The Difficult Coordination Process 
There is broad agreement in the PDWTE order of discourse that the contradictory messages in 
the war on terrorism have been a problem. Although efforts are made to streamline SD and 
DoD public diplomacy processes, a frequent complaint is that these agents are playing on too 
diverse strings. 
 
There are so many cooks involved, so many agencies involved in framing an American 
message, and they can’t agree on a message, because the bureaucracy has become so 
huge. Trying to get the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, 
various other interest groups to agree on a message, […] they wouldn’t know what to 
do (Brown, interview 23.2.2007). 
 
The size of the bureaucracy is not the only issue at stake here. As already mentioned, some 
SD-affiliated public diplomats are unhappy with the DoD and the military’s involvement in 
public diplomacy. The DoD has been called an “elephant in the room”, “a bull in a china 
store”, and its involvement in public diplomacy has been described as “It’s like giving a 
loaded gun to a child!” Of course, this negative sentiment can be attributed to the defence of 
tribal cultures, but it should not be surprising that coordination of public diplomacy messages 
can be difficult when the purpose and the means profoundly diverge.  
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 Some SD-affiliated public diplomats are upset with the DoD methods and literally feel 
that their own work is being undermined. One example is the practice of paying for media 
coverage: 
“I was there, in Afghanistan, when journalists asked me, ‘Mr. Fernandez, when do we 
get our money?’ They were bribing journalists! We could never do something like that. 
For one thing, we don’t have that kind of money. For the other, it would have been a 
very bad idea” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007).  
 
Although public diplomats experience difficulties with getting media coverage, they engage 
in a long-term relationship with journalists and editors and hence depend on credibility. For 
that reason, SD public diplomats are concerned that DoD practice is undermining the normal, 
“non-bribing way” (Schmierer, interview 2.3.2007). The concerns are that anything they get 
in the newspaper can be suspected for being there only because money changed hands, or that 
such practices contribute to the image of the US as a self-declared authority controlling in-
formation towards other countries. The DoD acceptance of such practices witnesses the dif-
ferences in time frame as well as purpose of the respective institutions’ approaches. 
 The discourses share the premise that anti-Americanism constitutes a security threat, 
but diverge on which game of power the threat is situated in and hence what practices are stra-
tegically appropriate. Moreover, the rules of the discourses have been produced through dif-
ferent intertextual histories. The politicized discourse resembles what is called “traditional 
public diplomacy”, which has a long history of debating the appropriateness of different 
methods. Securitized and marketized discourses, however, have little intertextual history, and 
hence, their rules are only known by the reaction following their deviance. It should not be 
surprising if the coordination process of SD and DoD public diplomacy and strategic commu-
nication practices turn out to be difficult. The respective institutions are designated to target 
different challenges that require different considerations, and for the same reason, they have 
different messages to communicate. 
5.3 Diverging Discourses – Clashing Messages  
How the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism is defined in a public diplomacy discourse 
affects which messages that will arise to explain and encounter it. The respective nodal points 
‘security’ and ‘soft power’ in securitizing and politicizing discourses connote fundamentally 
different representations of the geopolitical ‘Other’, the anti-American. Exchanges of these 
representations inevitably clash: the geopolitical representation of a security threat requires a 
corresponding representation of an enemy, while the soft power approach aims to build 
bridges. 
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 A central task of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism, in Charlotte Beers’ as well 
as Karen Hughes’ era, has been to challenge the tale of clash of civilisations. The ‘clash of 
civilisations’ theory was introduced by Samuel Huntington in Foreign Affairs in 199320 and 
has been established in different ways throughout the geopolitical culture. The ‘clash-thesis’ 
was developed within the pre-genre of formal geopolitics, and proposed that cultural and reli-
gious identities would be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. A ‘civili-
zation’ in this context refers to the highest rank of cultural identities. Huntington identified 
eight such civilizations in the world, mainly following religious lines: The African, Hindu, 
Western, Islamic, Sinic, Orthodox, Japanese and Latin American. 
 Huntington’s thesis is heavily debated in academia, but has been exported as mainly 
an image to practical and popular geopolitics. On the journey from formal to practical geo-
politics in the war on terrorism, the clash-thesis has changed connotations and refers to a clash 
between the civilization and the non-civilization. This representation has lingered with time: 
The first National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from February 2003 stated that, “The 
war against terrorism […] is not some sort of ‘clash of civilizations’; instead, it is a clash be-
tween civilisation and those who would destroy it” (Bush 2003, 29) On the President’s Ad-
dress to the Nation on the fifth anniversary of 9/11, the image was repeated: “This struggle 
has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization. […] We are 
now in the early hours of this struggle between tyranny and freedom” (Bush, 9.11.2006). The 
clash-thesis has also taken some hold in popular culture, but as popular geopolitics it has 
mainly been reduced to a metaphor, usually referring to a clash of binary civilizations. This is 
the clash-discourse that public diplomacy aims to challenge.  
 The clash-thesis constitutes fundamentally different tales in the politicizing and the 
securitizing discourses. According to the politicizing discourse, the diffusion of the tale itself 
constitutes a geopolitical threat, because it contributes to the idea that Muslim anti-
Americanism is natural. When an idea is perceived as natural, it is severely difficult to 
counter. A State Department official argued that because Al Qaeda feeds off the concept of 
polarisation, a major public diplomacy task is to break that image. The problem is that people 
in the US and the West sometimes mirror the polarised discourse, he argued:  
 
“This feeds into their idea of the conflict, this clash of civilization. That is why I al-
ways say on Arab media that ‘I am against Huntington. I reject that idea. I don’t be-
                                                 
20 The notion was first used by Bernard Lewis in 1990, but has since the formulation of the theory in 1993 been 
attributed to Huntington.  
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lieve in a clash of civilizations. Because we’re all part of the same civilization. The 
West is the child of the same civilization as Islam’” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007). 
 
In other words: while the politicized discourse uses public diplomacy to build alliances, the 
Bush administration’s definition of the war on terrorism as a clash between civilization and 
non-civilization counteracts the discourse. 
 In the politicized discourse, it is frequently argued that the very notion ‘war on terror-
ism’ is a public diplomacy challenge. One of the reasons is that the war on terrorism almost 
exclusively targets a certain kind of terrorism: Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The problem 
is, according to a public diplomat who recently served in Iraq,  
 
“when you mobilise your efforts worldwide against that threat, you’re mobilising them 
against an Arab/Muslim threat. So you’ve got that natural conflict where you’re doing 
what is appropriate security wise, but perception wise, it convinces some people in the 
Arab and Muslim world that it’s actually not against terrorism but against Arabs and 
Muslims” (Schmierer, interview 2.3.2007). 
 
The representation of the war on terrorism as a war on Muslims is according to SD public dip-
lomats also mirrored by the DoD and military’s practices. A SD public diplomat gave this ex-
ample: “In Guantanamo two Saudi prisoners committed suicide. Then, this US military offi-
cial called it a terrorist act, that they had killed themselves. Can you imagine? We had to clean 
up that mess!” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007).  
 The reason for the warnings from the politicized discourse against the equation of ter-
rorists and Muslims is that it enlarges the group that potentially could identify themselves as 
terrorists. Public diplomacy is designated to target the demand-side of terrorism, which is or-
dinary people’s inclination to sympathize with terrorist groups because they perceive the US 
as a worse alternative.  
 A basic problem is that a message that makes sense in one discourse has different im-
plications in another. Securitized public diplomacy is founded on the idea that the US is 
threatened, and this idea necessitates a representation of a conflict and an enemy. In politics 
and military discourses in the war on terrorism it makes sense to talk about ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and to present certain groups as enemies, because it stimulates domestic support. The geopo-
litical representation of the Muslim as the anti-American, however, simultaneously represents 
the American as anti-Muslim. 
 In chapter 6, I will analyse an example of a SD public diplomacy campaign that aims 
to deconstruct the image of a natural conflict between Americans and Muslims. But first, I 
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will analyse the politicized and securitized discourses’ relative establishment in the ‘public 
diplomacy in the war on terrorism era’ (PDWTE) order of discourse. 
5.4 The Relative Power of the Diverging Discourses  
There is a broad agreement in the US government that anti-Americanism should be countered 
with coordinated strategic communication. According to public diplomats, there has been an 
increased focus on perception since the earlier stages of the Iraq war, when the primary focus 
was on the military side. However, the increased attention on perceptions and strategic com-
munication has also changed the focus on public diplomacy. Two contradictory, yet concomi-
tant, processes seem to be occurring simultaneously: an overall securitization of public diplo-
macy and a purification of the politicized discourse. 
 DoD involvement in public diplomacy has until recent years officially been limited. In 
2001, the distribution of responsibility for public diplomacy between SD and DoD was in a 
report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination 
(DoD 2001), described as follows:  
 
“DoD public diplomacy is comprised of strategic actions such as deployment of troops and 
ships for combined training or demonstration of resolve, official visits, and defense and mili-
tary contacts with foreign officials. However, there is no one within DoD specifically tasked to 
plan or conduct PD activities even though DoD possesses enormous potential to influence for-
eign audiences through an organized and coordinated PD program.[…] The State Department 
is the primary Government agency responsible for the conduct of PD.”  
 
What should be noted from this October 2001 report is that the DoD performed public diplo-
macy without any coordinating unit, and that SD was acknowledged as the primary agency 
responsible for public diplomacy. In 2006, DoD declassified a new strategic direction, ap-
proved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2003. This direction, proposed in the QDR 
Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap, seeks to achieve three overarching objectives: 
(1) “Define roles and develop strategic communication doctrine for the primary communica-
tion-supporting capabilities: public affairs, information operations, military diplomacy, and 
defense support to public diplomacy.” (2) “Resource, organize, train, and equip DoD primary 
communication support capabilities.” (3) “Institutionalize a DoD process in which strategic 
communication is incorporated in the development of strategic policy, planning, and execu-
tion” (Eder 2007). Following this roadmap, the DoD established a Strategic Communication 
Integration Group (SCIG). This shift of ambitions for DoD public diplomacy indicates that 
the DoD position as a public diplomacy perpetrator has been significantly strengthened be-
tween 2001 and 2006 and increases its relevance in the PDWTE order of discourse.  
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 Although there is a broad agreement that public diplomacy is important in the war on 
terrorism and DoD resources for this task have been strengthened, the SD public diplomacy 
discourse is still struggling for recognition. When Karen Hughes entered the SD, it was ex-
pected that the status of public diplomacy would improve because the Under Secretary was 
close to the president. Still, according to the Director for Public Diplomacy for the Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department, Alberto Fernandez; the State Department finds 
that the Congress has a hard time understanding what public diplomacy is. “It’s easier for par-
liaments to approve money for national defence than, people understand that, ‘defend the 
motherland’, than to do ‘What, with foreigners? What are you doing with them? You’re giv-
ing them money to do what?’” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007). The result is, Fernandez ar-
gued, that the SD is not getting enough tools to do public diplomacy: “I just took a budget cut 
for our embassies that are doing this work of half a million dollars, so instead of having more 
money, […] they have less money to do this. Even though this problem is bigger in that re-
gion than it was before.” Fernandez estimated that the total SD spending on public diplomacy 
is about 800 million dollars. “That’s 800 million dollars,” he said, “but it’s nothing compared 
to how much money the Pentagon spends. The Pentagon has billions and billions of dollars” 
(Fernandez, Interview 28.2.2007). Another sign that SD public diplomacy does not corre-
spond with the Congress’ stated aims for the war on terrorism is that the Middle East accord-
ing to Fernandez is “not favoured over other parts of the world” when it comes to funding, 
although the problem of anti-Americanism is worse in that region (Fernandez, interview 
28.2.2007). 
 Fernandez is not the only SD-affiliated person who is concerned with how funding for 
public diplomacy has shifted from SD to DoD. A former Foreign Service Officer to Muslim 
countries argued that the DoD is using the war in Iraq as an “open wedge” to expand into pub-
lic diplomacy operations (Rugh, interview 26.2.2007). However, he argued, the purpose of 
this expansion is unclear. Another former Foreign Service Officer found that most people 
working for the DoD were not really interested in public diplomacy, but “because of the pres-
sure about the minds and hearts, from Congress and other American spheres of influence that 
the Pentagon felt that it had to get into the hearts and minds game war” (Brown, interview 
23.2.2007). Brown argued that SD public diplomacy people have been warned that the money 
for public diplomacy activities in the future will go to DoD. This duality is interesting: on the 
one hand, there has been an increased focus on ‘hearts and minds’, but the institution tradi-
tionally designated for the task is increasingly excluded in favour of another. 
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 According to John Stauber, the director of the Madison-based Center for Media and 
Democracy (CMD), which publishes critical literature on public diplomacy, the DoD employs 
arguments that resonate better with the Bush administration. Stauber has observed a split be-
tween public diplomacy people in the SD and the “war on Iraq-people” in the lead up to the 
Iraq war and up to today. Before the military intervention in Iraq, Stauber argued, Rumsfeld 
and Cheney “were on war” with Colin Powell and the public diplomacy types, and the latter 
lost that round (Stauber, interview 12.2.2007). Sheldon Rampton from the same institution 
(CMD) characterised these two viewpoints on American foreign policy as follows:  
 
“the public diplomacy people in the SD come from a philosophy, which focuses on the 
need to be diplomatic and try to cultivate friends. The Bush administration, on the 
other hand, fundamentally believes that hard power is the only real power, and that if 
you press your adversaries, their hearts and minds will fall” (Rampton, interview 
12.2.2007).  
 
Although this polarisation is intentionally overstated, it gives an impression of the discursive 
struggle. The relevance of the split is that the SD depends on the Bush administration and 
Congress for allocation of resources for public diplomacy. In order to get sufficient funding, 
the public diplomacy discourse needs to correspond with the Congress’ perception of its pur-
pose and utility. Towards the Congress, the securitized discourse is relatively stronger. How-
ever, the audience supporting the securitization of the discourse is not only the Congress, but 
also the agents involved. The practices of intentionally shifting tasks from the SD to the DoD 
and coordinating tasks to increasingly resemble DoD methods witness a securitizing effect on 
Karen Hughes’ approach to public diplomacy.  
 The securitization process of the PDWTE order of discourse is occurring on two lev-
els: firstly, tasks are shifted from SD to DoD, and secondly, the rules of public diplomacy 
change due to the redefinition of its purpose.  
 That being said, claiming that public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era has be-
come uniformly securitized, would be an overstatement. The incorporation of the notion of 
‘order of discourse’ in the security analysis opens the categories to explain the disintegrated 
succession of the securitization process. Simultaneously with the securitization of public di-
plomacy, the politicized discourse has within its own boundaries increasingly legitimised its 
position. Karen Hughes has at the same time purified the politicized discourse and validated 
different spaces for marketized and securitized public diplomacy. This purification may en-
hance the SD credibility without precluding the variety of methods for performing public di-
plomacy. However, when the methods applied and the messages to communicate diverge pro-
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foundly, the question is whether these can be compliant or the securitized discourse will un-
dermine the politicized in the end. The effect of the coordination may very well be a success-
ful sensitisation of the DoD information practices, but it is unlikely that the DoD changes the 
premise of its public diplomacy discourse, since it is firmly rooted in the mandate of the insti-
tution.  
5.5 The Geopolitical Rationale of Public Diplomacy in the PDWTE  
Three aspects explain the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era (PDWTE). The first aspect concerns what geopolitical representations that form the 
premises of this order of discourse, which I have argued is anti-Americanism and the geopo-
litical vision it is associated with. Various discourses struggle for the definition of the geopo-
litical situation, labelled politicized, securitized and marketized discourses according to how 
they construe the representation of anti-Americanism. The discourses share the premise that 
anti-Americanism constitutes a security threat, but diverge on which game of power the threat 
is situated in and hence what considerations should be incorporated in the strategy to counter 
it. In the politicized discourse, anti-Americanism is regarded as a threat to American soft 
power, which can only be won back with attractive means. In the securitized discourse, the 
threat is considered potentially existential against American territory and people as well as 
ideology, and should be countered with emergency measures. In the marketized discourse, 
anti-Americanism is situated in an economic game of power and constitutes a rather vague 
threat to American competitiveness and trade security. The game of power where the dis-
courses are situated shapes the guidelines, or “rules”, for public diplomacy. This is the second 
aspect of the geopolitical rationale: how the geopolitical representations manifest in public 
diplomacy efforts, through the designation of appropriate institutions, means and messages.  
 The most central institutions involved in public diplomacy activities in the war on ter-
rorism era are the State Department (SD) and the Department of Defense (DoD). Since 9/11, 
which was the catalyst of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era, the politicized, securi-
tized and marketized discourses have had different functions in each institution. The discur-
sive struggle about the geopolitical situation has manifested in a shift of resource allocations 
and tasks for public diplomacy from the SD to the DoD. In that sense, DoD, which largely 
produces a securitized discourse, has gradually strengthened its position as a public diplomacy 
perpetrator. The SD discourse has since 9/11 been characterised by two shifts represented by 
the different Under Secretaries of State for public diplomacy and public affairs, Charlotte 
Beers and Karen Hughes. In Beers’ era, a somewhat contradictory marketized and politicized 
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discourse was produced within the SD. Hughes cultivated space for all three discourses by 
outsourcing tasks to the DoD and encouraging the private sector to involve in public diplo-
macy activities.  
  Because the respective institutions are designated to target different geopolitical 
threats that require diverging considerations, they consider the appropriateness of methods 
and messages differently. Concerning the methods for public diplomacy, there is a conflict 
between the politicized discourse, which requires the use of attractive means, and the other 
discourses, which have fewer restrictions. The geopolitical representation each discourse is 
founded on sometimes also produces contradictory messages. While securitized public diplo-
macy is founded on a representation of a conflict and an enemy, politicized public diplomacy 
aims to attract allies. This natural conflict relates to the third aspect of the geopolitical ra-
tionale of this public diplomacy era, the output of the discursive struggle.  
 The result of the marketized and securitized discourses’ influence on public diplomacy 
involves that tasks have been shifted between agents and the rules of public diplomacy have 
changed due to the redefinition of their purpose. Simultaneously, the SD discourse has 
through the shifting of tasks defined its approach in negation to the securitized and marketized 
discourses and cultivated a soft power approach to public diplomacy. This double-edged 
process leaves a challenge for the future of American public diplomacy: to synchronise two 
strategies with profoundly divergent purpose, methods and messages.  
 In the following chapter, I will use the same questions to analyse a case, the public 
diplomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002. This campaign has been so much 
debated that it gives a unique insight in which methods and messages are considered contro-
versial or acceptable 
. 

6  SHARED VALUES INITIATIVE:         
  CONTROVERSY AND GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS  
 
The advertising campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002 is without doubt the most de-
bated public diplomacy effort in the war on terrorism era. Although the campaign is an early 
representative of this era, its continuing controversy reveals the rules and boundaries for the 
State Department public diplomacy discourse and makes it particularly interesting as a case. It 
has both politicizing and marketizing elements, and evolves in interplay with securitizing dis-
courses. As an advertising campaign, the strategic nature of the message also highlights the 
geopolitics of the discourse. 
 The campaign was the brainchild of then Under Secretary for public diplomacy and 
public affairs Charlotte Beers, who resigned her post following the controversy. It combined 
traditional public diplomacy methods with advertising, a new genre in public diplomacy. The 
campaign included speeches by American Muslims and diplomats to international audiences, 
town hall events in several countries, Internet sites and chat rooms, the 60-page colour maga-
zine Muslim Life in America, a series of newspaper and radio ads and five television com-
mercials. Because the other elements have received far less attention, I will only focus on the 
television ad campaign, from hereon called the SVI21.  
 In this chapter, two aspects of the campaign will be discussed. Firstly, I will conduct a 
geopolitical discourse analysis of the film spots, to search for geopolitical representations em-
bedded in their discourse, and how they manifest themselves. More specifically, these repre-
sentations relate to the portrayal of central geopolitical subjects: Muslims and Americans. 
Secondly, I will discuss the controversy of the campaign, and analyse its role in the develop-
ment of the order of discourse called ‘public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era’ 
(PDWTE): What does the debate about the campaign tell us about this order of discourse – 
what kinds of messages and methods are controversial and conventional? And what kind of 
power does the campaign execute? But first, I will briefly present the campaign and the ana-
                                                 
21 The SVI will interchangeably be called SVI and ‘the campaign’ when referring to the product and the infra-
structure of its making, and ‘the ads’ and ‘the spots’ when referring to the discursive content. 
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lytical strategy employed. It can be useful to watch the spots or read the transcription of the 
Shared Values television commercials in the appendix before proceeding.22 
6.1 SVI as a Geopolitical Counter Discourse 
The intention of the SVI campaign, according to internal State Department reports, was “to 
foster free, candid and respectful engagement and exchange between Americans and people 
from the Muslim world” (Fullerton and Kendrick 2006, 26). According to Under Secretary 
Charlotte Beers, Fullerton and Kendrick write, “the ultimate goal for the campaign would 
be ‘discussion and debate’, as opposed to changing minds about US foreign policy” (Ibid, 27). 
The target audience was “the people”, especially mothers and teachers in the target countries. 
In order to understand the target audience, Beers consulted a research tool called Val-
ueScopeTM, which employs consumer research based on personal values. This research identi-
fies 57 values that respondents are asked to rank in the order of personal importance. The 
2002 ValueScopeTM research revealed several differences between the US and Muslim coun-
tries, but also significant agreement on values such as faith, family and learning. Based on 
these findings, Beers designed a campaign to focus on the shared values of Americans and 
Muslims. The work with the campaign started shortly after Beers was sworn in as Under Sec-
retary in October 2001. Throughout Ramadan in 2002, the campaign was aired on state-run 
media systems in Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Kuwait. It was also available to viewers 
in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Lebanon and the United Arab Emir-
ates via pan-Arab satellite and in Kenya and Tanzania through embassy placement. 
 The campaign consists of five short ads, depicting American Muslims in their daily 
lives in the US. Their respective titles reflect the profession of the main characters: Baker, 
Doctor, Teacher, Journalist and Fire fighter. Each spot lasts for about two minutes, except 
the spot Fire fighter, which lasts for one minute. Visually, the spots are simple and look 
home-made. The stories are narrated mainly through the voice of one or two main characters, 
supported by images and music. Because the characters appear so determined about the sub-
ject under discussion, it seems like they either “answer” questions that they perceive the target 
audience to have, or even deliberately try to challenge a discourse they perceive as dominat-
ing.23  
                                                 
22 The film spots can be downloaded from http://www.osu-tulsa.okstate.edu/sharedvalues/commercials.aspx 
23 Whether the questions actually stem from the characters or the producer is unclear. Although characters’ ar-
ticulations appear to be personal, they may have been carefully directed, but neither do I find any indications of 
this nor is it important for the analysis.   
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 I will employ an analytical strategy that I have developed with notions from Bakhtin, 
Young and Laclau and Mouffe, with emphasis on finding relations and boundaries between 
discourses through polyphony and negation. The operational research question is why are the 
characters saying what they are saying? A premise for this analytical strategy is that the ads 
do not operate in accordance with their own discursive conventions: they are a contribution to 
an already established discursive struggle. I understand the spots as a counter discourse to a 
perceived dominating discourse about the US in Muslim countries. When understood as such, 
the spots give access to two geopolitical discourses simultaneously: the Storyrealm, or the 
discourse of the film spots, and the imagined intertextual history that the characters “talk 
back” to, the Taleworld. The characters’ contribution is thus to a discursive struggle to pre-
vent the thought adversary discourse’s hegemony. This makes their discourse polyphonic of 
the third kind: the characters draw their understanding from a discourse that is nowhere men-
tioned. Although the intentions of the campaign are beyond the scope of this analysis, it is 
hard to imagine that the campaign had been produced if no discourse had existed claiming 
that Muslims were badly treated in the US. Still, it should be noted that the findings of the 
forthcoming analysis are based on the analytical strategy rather than the intention of the film-
maker or articulator. I will not discuss the quality of the campaign, but rather look for the 
geopolitical representations the film spots reveal in their implicit representation of the others’ 
discourse. 
6.2 The Geopolitical Tales of the SVI Spots 
The significance of identifying the geopolitical representations of a public diplomacy cam-
paign is not only of intrinsic value. Because geopolitical discourses give insight into how 
geopolitical subjects are understood in a geopolitical culture, it gives certain indications of 
how they are acted towards in the geopolitical order. This insight reveals the power structure 
between geopolitical subjects as well as the perceived geopolitical purpose of their relation. 
 I will now analyse each film spot in turn. The presented order is coincidental; they 
were aired independently and separately. I will focus on the main aspects of each spot in this 
paragraph and analyse the SVI ads as a whole in the next.  
6.2.1 Baker: Relational Identities Based on Religion and Nationality 
The first spot is about the Libyan Abdul Hammuda, who presents himself as “the owner of 
Tiger Lebanese bakery located here in Toledo, Ohio, the United States of America”.  
 The film spot starts with a happy Muslim family in a living room, singing and playing 
drums. Hammuda’s voice breaks in: “I believe American people in general respect the Islamic 
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faith. Muslims can practice their faith in totality here”. When applying the analytical strategy 
discussed above, regarding the articulations as an “answer” to an unmentioned discourse, 
what we understand from this is that he believes that the spectator might think the opposite: 
that Americans do not respect Islamic faith, and that Muslims can not practice their faith in 
the US. The articulation also reveals a construction of identity in relational terms: Muslims 
are a distinct group and different to American people. The implicitness of this representation 
indicates that it is discursively hegemonised from the Taleworld he draws his perspective 
from. Throughout the film spot, Hammuda continues to establish his own identity in nega-
tion to an American identity. Not only is he the owner of a bakery in the US, but a Lebanese 
bakery that also serves dishes from Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Instead of, say, presenting 
his bakery as one of many different bakeries in town, Hammuda emphasises the foreign na-
ture of his bakery. Hammuda’s family is also presented in the film spot. Together with Ham-
muda and his wife, their son and daughter work in the bakery. Not only the foreign identity is 
emphasized, but also the religious. A visual signifier of this is the hijabs on the women’s 
heads. Hammuda was also one of the co-founders of the Toledo Islamic Academy, “from pre-
k to high school”. Hammuda: “Religious freedom here is something very important, and we 
see it practiced and no one ever bothered us.” With this articulation, Hammuda implies that 
the spectator would believe that Muslims are bothered for their religious practice. It is uncer-
tain what Hammuda means by “we see it practiced”, whether he is referring to Muslims or 
other religious groups. But no other references to other religious groups are made. There are, 
however, references to other groups: customers and clients, from whom “we” (the Hammu-
das, I suppose) have enjoyed “an overwhelming sense of support” since 9/11. In other words, 
not only Hammuda self, but also the customers and clients associate the Hammudas with Is-
lam (or other groups connected with the terrorist attack, but Islam is probably the closest call). 
Hammuda concludes the spot with: “America is a land of opportunity, of equality. We are 
happy to live here as Muslims and preserve our faith”. Again, he implies that a discourse ex-
ists that claims the opposite, and in addition to rejecting this view, he implies that this cultural 
“generosity” is not to take for granted. The Muslims, in this Storyrealm, are a distinct 
autonomous and tolerated group that, even when they live in America, is not American. Why 
Hammuda maintains this division can seem cryptic because he otherwise seems so well inte-
grated in the American society. The ubiquitous visual and uttered representations of national 
and religious identity seem important for the ad’s message, and can indicate a polyphonic an-
swer to a discourse accusing Muslim Americans of being assimilated and abandoning their 
native identity. Some of the other spots indicate the same. 
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6.2.2 Doctor: Assimilation and Universal Egalitarianism   
The next spot is about the Algerian-born Dr. Zerhouni, the director of the National Institute of 
Health in America, a position to which he has been nominated by President George W. Bush. 
Zerhouni talks about what he calls a “profound connection” between medicine and Islam: 
“The notion that science can improve health has been borne out in Islam for many centuries. 
Some of the best doctors in the history of the world have been Muslim doctors.” The motiva-
tion behind these articulations can seem cryptic. Would a Muslim, the target audience, con-
sider the relationship between Islam and medicine a contradiction? That is unlikely. “The 
mission of the National Institute of Health is to advance knowledge about the medical care 
and diseases that affect mankind,” Zerhouni proceeds. Because the intrinsic value of medical 
knowledge in Islam is already stated, this articulation connects Islam with the American insti-
tute, and the institution is already presented as deeply anchored in American politics. But is 
this a response to an idea that Muslim and American culture diverge on these issues? Not 
likely. It could be a reminder that the US and Islam have some shared values at all. But fetch-
ing farther in the logic of negation can also reveal a discourse of assimilation in Zerhouni’s 
Taleworld: that the discourse he is talking back to, assumes that Muslims in the US are 
Americanised, a discourse Zerhouni’s position as a successful doctor could be seen as con-
firming. There are further indications of such a polyphonic discourse in Zerhouni’s articula-
tion: “When we develop a new treatment, it is available worldwide, so it impacts on the health 
of everyone on Earth.” The polyphonic “question” this could be an answer to, is whether the 
US employs foreigners only to serve Americans, or, whether the doctor’s motivation for 
working in the US are because he elevates the importance of the Americans’ health above that 
of others. Zerhouni continues to emphasize that his choice of becoming a doctor is not due to 
him being assimilated into American values: “I became very interested in medicine because I 
had an uncle who was actually a radiologist.” Following the logic of negation, Zerhouni’s ar-
ticulations can be understood as (1) he wants to state the shared American-Muslim values of 
medical knowledge, and (2) to avoid being seen as another assimilated American, he empha-
sizes that these values originate in Islam and for himself, in his native country.  
 Zerhouni also talks about the universal egalitarianism of the American culture, and his 
experience with coming to the US in 1975: “I was totally embraced by people here, my pro-
fessors. You know, everybody told me we are all immigrants here, we are all from different 
places, and we all melt together and I love that, I really do.” This articulation can be seen as a 
rejection of an idea that Muslims in America are socially excluded. But with this articulation, 
he also partly breaks down the discourse of intrinsic difference that the other spots maintain. 
 87
However, in his next articulation he maintains a division between Muslims and the American 
society when he highlights the particularity of this cultural integration: “What I can tell Mus-
lims around the world is the tolerance and support I’ve received myself is remarkable. I don’t 
think that there is any other country in the world, where I think different people from different 
countries are accepted and welcomed as members of the society, as good citizens.” The 
hegemonic representation here is thus the relevance of the immanent difference between “dif-
ferent people from different countries”: it is reproduced as a natural division of the American 
society.  
6.2.3 Teacher: Equivalence and Difference  
The next spot is about Rawia Ismail, a female public schoolteacher from Beirut, Lebanon who 
has lived in the US since 1984.  
 Ismail talks about how it is like to wear a hijab in the classroom: “I’ve never met a 
child who thought it was weird or anything like that, and they like the fact, both them and 
their parents, that they are introduced to a different culture.” Implicitly, what we can read 
from this is the existence of a discourse that assumes the opposite, that Muslim symbols are 
met with incomprehension in the US and that people do not like differences. She also implies, 
like Hammuda does, that the local (American24) culture is a distinct culture different to Mus-
lim culture. Ismail also teaches her children in Saturday school, Islamic school. This is not a 
sign of difference between Ismail and the non-Muslims, but rather one of equivalence: “In my 
neighbourhood all the non-Muslims, I see that they care a lot about their children’s education, 
just as much as I do and about family values.” What she implicitly rejects with this articula-
tion is an idea that Americans do not care about family values and children’s education. Her 
final remark in the spot is: “I had to work hard at getting the kids to understand that […] we 
should work on our similarities rather than our differences”. This articulation can be an indi-
cation of the existence of two separate discourses she is talking back to: (1) the assimilation-
discourse discussed above and (2) the inevitability of culture clashes between Americans and 
Muslims. First: the fact that she had to “work hard” at convincing the kids, and that she ad-
mits clear differences between the groups, could be a negation of a discourse claiming that 
Muslim children in America are assimilated and Americanised. Second, the use of past tense 
in the word had, reveals that the mission is accomplished and “working on our similarities” is 
thus not impossible. Drawn even further, this could be an answer to and negation of the previ-
                                                 
24 Ismail never mentions Americans as a group, only the United States, the non-Muslims and her neighbours, to 
all of which she contrasts herself and her religion. Because it is not always clear which group she is talking 
about, I will refer to it as “American” and hereby caution against the lack of specificity.    
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ously discussed “clash of civilisations” discourse, but of course, the data does not support a 
conclusion of such specificity.     
6.2.4 Journalist: Shared, Rather Than Imposed, Values  
The next spot is about Devianti Faridz, an Indonesian Master’s student of broadcast journal-
ism at the University of Missouri. She is concerned with shared educational values and reli-
gious tolerance.   
 
“To become a journalist, of course, you have to uphold truth. You have to be honest; 
you have to be objective, and all those values I’ve already learned. […] The values of 
Islam that I have been taught ever since I was a child are values that I have been ex-
posed to here at school – honesty, truth, knowledge.”  
 
The relevance of these articulations in an ad campaign for the US can seem unclear because 
they do not directly address the US or American values. Faridz does not talk about the simi-
larities between Americans or the US and Islam, but the journalist school/profession and Is-
lam. However, she has come to the US to study journalism and finds these values important 
there. What Faridz rejects in this articulation, are that the US has changed (Americanised) her, 
and given her new values: she implies that honesty, truth and knowledge are values shared 
between the respective cultures. And she proceeds: “I hope to be able to go back to Indonesia 
and become an objective journalist who can contribute to the betterment of society,” Faridz 
says, indicating that her stay in the US can help her cultivate these values.  
 The value of religious tolerance is also stated in the spot. Faridz looks like a typical 
integrated American in her casual Western style. Then suddenly, she is in the mosque praying, 
wearing religious clothing. “So far,” she says, “the American students I have met have re-
spected my beliefs”. Again, this indicates the existence of a discourse claiming the opposite. 
However, the use of the words “so far” also indicates that Faridz does not take this respect for 
granted. Rather, there is a latent scepticism to the current situation in her assessment of how 
people should perceive difference: “We should embrace diversity and differences, and not be 
afraid of them.” Faridz concludes with an optimistic remark: “It is nice to know that Ameri-
cans are willing to understand more about Islam, and there is an opportunity for understand-
ing.” This articulation is ambiguous, and can be seen as a double-rejection of (1) an idea that 
Americans are unwilling to understand or (2) ignorance of the opposite fact. 
6.2.5 Fire fighter: Associated Religion and Collective Guilt  
The final spot is shorter than the others and has two main characters: Farooq Muhammad, a 
paramedic for a fire department in New York, and Abdul Malik, a volunteer chaplain with the 
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MT Police department. Muhammad talks about how it is like having co-workers with differ-
ent faiths, like Jewish, Christian, and Hindu: 
 
“We get along fine. You know, we treat each other with respect. They have all been 
supportive of me since the 9/11 attack and I have been very grateful for that. I have 
never gotten disrespected because I am a Muslim. […] We are all brothers and sisters 
and here I am as a human being taking care of another.” 
 
These articulations indicate, like the similar analyses from above, the existence of a discourse 
about religious (Muslim) intolerance in the US. Although Muhammad dismisses this dis-
course, he upholds with his gratefulness that tolerance is not to be taken for granted. This am-
biguity maintains a separation between groups and may indicate a sense of Muslim collective 
guilt against the rest caused by 9/11 and a latent cultural conflict. It is interesting that 
Mohammad as well as Hammuda and Ismail25 define themselves in positive relation to 9/11 
just because the terrorists were Muslim coreligionists. The fact that they as Muslims have in-
ternalised a representation of the “Muslim” with “terrorist” as a moment in the chain of 
equivalence reveals a strong bond of religious identity and sense of collective guilt. 
 Malik talks about working for “those who are putting their lives on the line each and 
every day to protect the citizens of this nation”, and emphasises the religious nature of his 
work: 
“It is my responsibility to do whatever I can, whether that is offering counselling or 
spiritual guidance or words of acknowledgement of the hard work they are doing. […]  
I think Muslims in America have more freedom to work for Islam, perhaps more than 
any country that I have visited.”  
 
The negation of these articulations could be a discourse about the US being a godless com-
munity with little opportunity for religious establishment. Malik implies that US not only is 
an ideal place for Muslims, because the society facilitates Islamic practices, but that it even 
tops the “list” of countries worthy of deserving Muslim sympathy.  
 
6.2.6 Summary 
I have in the analysis of the spots focused on the following aspects: the relationship between 
Americans and Muslims, similarities and differences between their respective identities, the 
shared values of family, education, knowledge, honesty and truth, the universal egalitarianism 
                                                 
25 Ismail also talks about the lack of prejudice after 9/11, but I have not addressed it in the text. 
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and the opportunity of religious establishment in the American society, and religious tolerance 
in the US. Some of these elements are challenged, others carried on.  
 The analytical findings are summarised in the model below: how the Storyrealm 
represents the Taleworld’s and its own understanding of Americans, Muslims in America and 
the relationship between these. Numbers in brackets indicate the spots in which the represen-
tations are present. 
 
Relationship Americans and Mus-
lims in America 
Muslims in America Americans 
Storyrealm Taleworld Storyrealm Taleworld Storyrealm Taleworld 
 
Distinct, different 
groups (1-5) 
 
Peaceful co-
existence (1-5) 
 
Allies (1-5) 
 
 
Shared values: 
Knowledge 
(2,3,4), education 
(3,4), truth (4), 
family (3), com-
munity (3,5) 
 
Distinct,  
different groups (1-5) 
 
Inherent culture clash 
(1-5) 
 
Muslims either ex-
cluded or 
Americanised (1-5) 
 
… 
 
 
Maintain religious 
faith, 
practices and 
symbols (1-5) 
 
 
Associated with 
9/11 (1,3,5) 
 
Integrated/ for-
eign (1-5) 
 
  
 
Abandon reli-
gious faith, 
practices and 
symbols (1-5) 
 
 
Associated with 
9/11 (1,3,5) 
 
Either assimi-
lated/ 
Americanised  
or excluded (1-
5) 
 
 
Religious toler-
ance (1-5) 
 
Willing to learn 
(3,4) 
 
Universal egali-
tarianism (2) 
 
Family- and 
community 
oriented (3) 
 
Religious dis-
crimination (1-5) 
 
Incomprehension 
(3,4) 
 
Americans above 
the rest 
(2) 
 
Individualistic (3) 
Figure 6.1: The Re-mapping of Geopolitical Identities in the SVI 
 
The representation of the American in a logic of difference to the Muslim is established in the 
ads’ Taleworld and carried on and hegemonised by the Storyrealm. However, some moments 
are challenged: the idea that an inherent culture clash exists between Americans and Muslims, 
and that Muslims are either excluded from the society or assimilated. Rather, the spots rein-
state that the two groups live in peaceful co-existence, and that there is an active relation be-
tween them. The shared values introduced in the Storyrealm do not seem to “talk back” to the 
Taleworld, and are thus represented as new elements.  
 In the next paragraph, I will analyse the geopolitical rationale of the campaign’s por-
trayal of the relation between Muslims and Americans.  
6.3  Geopolitical Alliances in the SVI Spots  
What do we understand from the SVI’s representation of Americans and Muslims? We can 
conclude from the analysis that the relationship between Americans and Muslims is repre-
sented as mutually exclusive and peacefully co-existent, but does it also indicate a power 
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structure of responsibilities and privileges? I will in the following analyse the ads’ construc-
tion of the geopolitical relations. 
 Three geopolitical subjects are represented in the ads. These are (1) the not-
assimilated, American well-integrated Muslims, represented by the characters (2) the imag-
ined Muslim spectator and/or supposed originator of the Taleworld discourse, and (3) the 
Americans, who exist only in the ads’ Taleworld. Between these three geopolitical subjects, 
two consolidations of groups take place: the characters with the Muslim audience they are 
reaching out to, and this united Muslim identity with the Americans. The natures of the re-
spective groups differ profoundly: What consolidates the Muslims as a group is a matter of 
equivalence, while what consolidates the Muslims and the Americans is a matter of alliance.  
 The Muslims are united in a logic of equivalence to essential Muslim identity markers 
discussed above and to the 9/11 attack, and the unity of the group is further consolidated in a 
logic of difference to Americans. Although the characters are American Muslims, the identity 
of the Muslim is constructed in distinction to that of the American: they remain distinct, dif-
ferent groups and are decidedly not assimilated. This logic of difference is interesting because 
the two groups are not mutually exclusive: they do not represent two different nationalities or 
religions, but one religion and one nationality. No references to other religions are made. The 
spots do not juxtapose the American with, say, the Christian, but rather represent it as a place 
and a people. Still, this place/people (USA/Americans) is understood in the negative terms of 
the religion/religious group (Islam/Muslims).   
 Despite the insistence on maintaining the division between Americans and Muslims: 
the fact that Muslims are chosen to tell “America’s story” and their emphasis on shared values 
and peaceful co-existence construes the relationship between the groups as mutually benefi-
cial. Because the distinction between the groups remains, the depicted Muslims are not under-
stood as Americans, but rather as allies of America. These findings raise interesting questions. 
What can we understand from this discursive remapping of geopolitical subjects? What is the 
rationale behind fixating such an alliance in the first place?  
 What the fixation of geopolitical allies entails is also a question about what alliances 
are. Alliance building can have multiple associations, like relations between states or compa-
nies, even marriages between people and families. Typical representations of interstate alli-
ances, as discussed in the theory chapter, are that they are formed when confronted by an ex-
ternal threat, which they encounter by bandwagoning or balancing the threat. Any alliance, 
like the Muslim-American in the SVI, implies an allegiance against something external, and 
because the US represents itself as a source of peace rather than danger, the nature of this alli-
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ance seems to be to balance the external threat rather than bandwagon. Interestingly, the con-
strued alliance is not between Americans and Muslims against terrorists: The representation 
of the 9/11 terrorist attack remains unchallenged as a moment on the Muslim chain of equiva-
lence. The Muslims are not asked to cut off their bonds with their terrorist co-religionists: 
they are asked to feel collective guilt, and the extension of this collective guilt is to give the 
US moral superiority. The external threat is thus not terrorism, but rather not being an ally 
with the US.  
 Another theory of alliance formation is ideological solidarity: the more similar states 
are, the more likely they are to ally. The emphasis on shared values in public diplomacy can 
be understood as an attempt to build alliances on an ideological foundation. This is interesting 
because an acknowledged source of the resentment towards the US in the Arab and Muslim 
world is the US’ inclination to ally with repressive regimes. The US even united with jihadis 
in opposition to the Soviet regime during the Cold War. The focus on shared values in SVI 
campaign can be understood as an attempt to re-articulate the legitimacy of alliance building 
or to nuance the perspective on the US’ intentions, which are frequently criticised for being 
calculating and selfish. But what does a legitimate alliance with the US involve? One indica-
tion lies in the campaign itself and how it makes use of the allegiance with the Muslim char-
acters. The way it uses Muslims to speak on the US’ behalf witnesses a demand for discursive 
loyalty: the allies are utilised as a buffer against hostile discourses. Such a discursive buffer 
can contribute to American security because the war on terrorism necessitates a discursive 
struggle: Al Qaeda largely depends on the dissemination of hostile discourses to gain public 
(and financial) support. The legitimacy of the alliance with the Muslim characters in the SVI 
originates from the mutually beneficial nature of their relation, represented by the characters’ 
gratitude for being accepted as citizens. In the next turn, the legitimacy of the alliance depo-
liticises the relation and naturalises the fact that Muslims are utilised to disseminate American 
norms and perspectives rather than their own. 
 An acknowledged technique of the campaign was the use of Muslim opinion leaders in 
the US to reach out to opinion leaders in Muslim countries. The characters chosen to represent 
Muslims in America are identified by their respectable professions; the designated target au-
dience was mothers and teachers. What the characters and target audience have in common is 
a similar kind of authority: they are trusted people in their society. The doctor certainly 
mounts the eminence of the rest, but all-in-all, the characters appear as down-to-earth, not too-
flashy fellow humans. This choice of characters and target audience suggests that the credibil-
ity of the messenger was seen as vital to the campaign. It was assumed that if the US State 
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Department was identified as the source of the commercials, it could be regarded as propa-
ganda and lose credibility. Therefore, in the spring of 2002, Charlotte Beers and the SD 
asked Malik Hasan, a Muslim retired medical executive, for help in creating a non-profit, non-
partisan organization called The Council of American Muslims for Understanding 
(CAMU). Each ad was presented with the line “Presented by the Council of American Mus-
lims for Understanding”. The intention of attributing the ads to CAMU was, according to 
Fullerton and Kendrick, “a strategic decision designed to enhance source credibility and make 
the message more believable” (2006, 31). Unfortunately for the SD, covering the source had 
the opposite effect of making the campaign more controversial, which I will discuss later.  
 What we can understand from the SVI’s representation of Americans and Muslims can 
be summarised as follows: Firstly, the Muslim is defined in distinction to the American and 
their relationship is one of alliance. Secondly, the rationale behind this relationship is to form 
an alliance against an external threat, which is not being an ally with the US. Thirdly, the rela-
tion is perceived as legitimate because it is beneficial for both parties, although the moral su-
periority belongs to the US. Fourthly, the legitimacy of the alliance depoliticises the relation 
and naturalises the use of Muslim opinion leaders to influence the public opinion in Muslim 
countries on the US’ behalf. 
 I will now turn to the controversy of the campaign, and analyse its role in the devel-
opment of the PDWTE order of discourse. 
6.4 Controversy Reveals the Rules of the Discourse 
As discussed in chapter 5, there exists a discursive struggle about the practice of public di-
plomacy in the order of discourse described as the ‘public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era’ (PDWTE). Politicized, securitized and marketized discourses struggle for the definition 
of the geopolitical threat and which public diplomacy perpetrators, methods and messages are 
best designated to counter it.   
Because the SVI campaign has received so much attention, a study of the debate gives 
insight into what methods and messages are considered legitimate and illegitimate for and in 
the SD public diplomacy discourse. The introduction of the advertising genre in the public 
diplomacy discourse is well described by Fairclough’s notion of marketization, but the con-
troversy shows that SD public diplomacy discourse was not ready for this process. I will in 
the following discuss the response to the campaign and analyse the rules of the discourse.  
 During and after the campaign, the SVI caused a heated debate in domestic and inter-
national news media; and academics, communications scholars, advertising executives, dip-
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lomats and government officials concluded with various arguments that the campaign was a 
failure. In the book Advertising’s War on Terrorism (2006), Fullerton and Kendrick offer a 
systematic study of how the SVI campaign was received. Following quotes from foreign news 
media give a brief introduction to the response:26  
 
“Another Zionist propaganda tool”  
“The campaign comes in conjunction with beating the drums of the Iraq war”  
“The campaign caused incitement against US policy in several Islamic countries, in-
cluding demonstrations denouncing US policy in Indonesia”  
“A cynical campaign that insults the intelligence of the average Muslim”  
“What we understand from this campaign is that Americans just need a small cloth to 
polish their image, and that’s it!” 
 
Two complaints dominated the debate. The first was that the campaign was considered as 
propaganda, and the second was that the campaign did not explain US foreign policy (Fuller-
ton & Kendrick 2006, 36). In other words: the debate mainly evolved around the genre and 
what the campaign was not about – the message has largely escaped without controversy. I 
will analyse what is controversial and accepted in the discourse, to assess the campaign’s 
function in the PDWTE order of discourse. 
6.4.1 The Propaganda Controversy 
To begin with the propaganda issue; this problem followed the campaign from its very initia-
tion and remains to this day probably its closest connotation.  
Inside the State Department, the SVI was from the beginning known as “Charlotte’s 
project”, because Beers had full control of the project and final approval of the ads. Beers’ 
Madison Avenue- and Uncle Ben’s advertising background was frequently ridiculed in US 
mass media. Proclamations like “The notion that you can sell Uncle Sam like Uncle Ben’s 
(rice) is highly problematic”, “Uncle Sam is harder to sell these days than Uncle Ben’s ever 
was” and “to call our country a brand is to denigrate it in people’s minds” (Fullerton & Ken-
drick 2006, 104), emphasized the scepticism of many to the very idea that the US could be 
reduced to a commodity for sale. Many SD people were unhappy with the SVI because the 
advertising situated genre associated public diplomacy too much with propaganda. The genres 
of propaganda and advertising are both situated in a discourse of domination and information 
control that usually are particularly negatively perceived when they are government spon-
sored. To avoid the propaganda label, the SD insisted on calling the spots “mini-
                                                 
26 See Fullerton and Kendrick (2006) for original sources. In my study, these quotes merely form a tale the 
Storyrealm relates to, and hence the source is not relevant. 
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documentaries” instead of ads, tried to have them aired outside of the normal commercial air-
time and attributed the campaign to the Council of American Muslims for Understanding 
(CAMU). The technique of covering the source, called the ‘deflective source model’, is ac-
cording to the leading propaganda scholars Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) associated with grey 
propaganda and disinformation. It was quickly revealed that the SD was the original source, 
and the mere use of this technique caused harsh criticism.  
Another problem caused by the propaganda issue was the difficulties of airing the 
campaign. The State Department initially hoped to get free airtime in the Islamic countries, 
but ended up having to purchase airtime on international TV-stations, and furthermore, the 
state-owned stations in most countries completely refused to run the spots. Al Jazeera was ini-
tially positive to the campaign, but ended up boycotting it as well (Fullerton and Kendrick 
2006, 34). The reason for this negative attitude towards the SVI, according to Beers, was 
probably that it was considered as propaganda (Ibid, 35). In other words, the propaganda issue 
followed the campaign and was seen by many as having an undermining effect. 
As much as three studies have analysed the propaganda aspect of the SVI, and al-
though they agree that the campaign has clear propagandistic features, the studies disagree 
about whether it is a problem. Patrick Lee Plaisance (2005) distrusts Beers’ stated purpose of 
the SVI, to foster dialogue, and suggests that the campaign’s propagandistic nature reveals a 
different objective. The mere use of propaganda, in Plaisance’s opinion, shows that the cam-
paign has “serious ethical shortcomings” (Plaisance 2005, 251). Sheldon Rampton at the Cen-
ter for Media and Democracy posted a blog review about the SVI.27 A main criticism in the 
article is what Rampton calls “monologue about dialogue”, because the campaign did not en-
able dialogue, hardly even on the official SVI website OpenDialogue.org. Rampton concludes 
that propaganda, in addition to being dishonest, fails the effectiveness test because it is inca-
pable of creating genuine understanding. The only advocates of the campaign and its methods 
I have come across are the advertising scholars Fullerton and Kendrick (2006), who argue that 
the campaign could have been efficient if it was aired longer. Although they agree that the 
campaign has propagandistic features, Fullerton and Kendrick argue that it is generally truth-
ful and therefore defendable. Just as interesting as how negatively propaganda is perceived, is 
how critics seem to agree that dialogue is the better choice of method. Dialogue is considered 
ethical, genuine and effective for mutual understanding. This appears to me like a shortcut: 
                                                 
27 http://www.prwatch.org/node/6465. Calling a blog review a “study” may seem somewhat ambitious, but the 
review adds to similar writings from the same author, like the book Weapons of Mass Deception from 2003, 
written together with J. Stauber.  
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there is no guarantee that dialogue is less manipulative than propaganda, even with the best of 
intentions. Although dialogue is a better facilitator for learning, it can also be a negotiation in 
which the strongest party is bound to lead and the weakest legitimises with its participation. 
Because the purpose of dialogue often is to come to an agreement, this communication situa-
tion necessitates willing parties in order to succeed, which requires a careful audience selec-
tion. The effect of such selected willingness can be to encourage compromise and facilitate a 
relaxed attitude towards the information in cases where a critical approach might be more 
beneficial for the weakest party.28 In contrast, propaganda – at least when it is recognised as 
such – can have the effect of empowering the listeners as responsible for their own opinions, 
encouraging them to take sides. The point here is not to advocate propaganda as ethical com-
munication, but exemplify how any form of communication can have positive or negative 
moral associations, which again affects the perception of the content.  
The main problem for a public diplomacy campaign with being associated with propa-
ganda is that the genre itself and the credibility associated with the situated genre, affect how 
the message is framed by the spectators. When a message is framed as propaganda in a 
Storyrealm (here referring to the spectators), the meaning attributed to the genre “leaks” to the 
Taleworld (the message). If the spectators dislike propaganda, and the message is framed as 
such, the effort can be counterproductive.  
 That being said, the campaign’s genre is not only inefficient as an instrument for 
power. Although the advertising genre in terms of credibility does not do the campaign any 
favours, its “popular” expression depoliticises its message. As a result, the content escapes 
attention and remains unchallenged. In the case of the SVI, this seems only partly to be the 
case. On the one hand, the campaign has been debated and highly controversial. But despite 
the controversy, the content of the campaign has largely circumvented analysis: the focus on 
the campaign has mainly been on its naïve propagandistic features.  
6.4.2 The Message Approval 
As mentioned, the second dominating controversy was what the campaign did not explain. 
There are two ways of analysing the status of a message in a discourse: through what is said 
about it, and through what is not said about it. Considering the large amount of literature writ-
ten about the SVI campaign, strikingly little has been mentioned about its content. One of the 
chief complaints was that the focus of the campaign was off-target: people blamed America’s 
                                                 
28 For a thorough debate about the ethics of dialogue and propaganda, see Stoker and Tusinski (2006).  
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tarnished image on US foreign policy, not on how Muslims are treated in America (Fullerton 
& Kendrick 2006, 105).  
 There seem to be a broad agreement that the message of the campaign is legitimate, 
and the relationship between Americans and Muslims is portrayed accurately. It has been 
mentioned that the campaign is a selective representation of reality, since post-9/11 persecu-
tion and incarcerations of Muslims have been reported (Plaisance 2005). However, the por-
trayed relationship between Muslims and Americans in the SVI has hardly evoked any debate. 
Rather, even critics of the campaign have emphasized that religious tolerance is an accurate 
description of the situation for Muslims in the US. Another tale that is nowhere challenged is 
the tale about desired division: that Muslims as well as Americans wish to keep their identities 
separate. This apparent agreement can be seen as an indication that the portrayal of the rela-
tionship is representative of critical as well as practicing public diplomacy discourses.  
 The acceptance of the message demonstrates its soft power, even as a geopolitical tool. 
As a form of popular geopolitics, the campaign is situated in the power structure of the broad 
geopolitical culture. An important function of popular geopolitics is to establish a beneficial 
point of discourse and create a “smooth space” for practical geopolitics. This form of power is 
essentially soft: it attracts and co-opts people to change preferences rather than it coerces 
them. The campaign does not ask people to change; it merely advocates a perspective on the 
desirable form of Muslim-American relations. If it succeeds, the campaign will establish an 
American point of discourse in the popular culture that over time materialises in the target 
countries’ foreign policies or other spheres beneficial to the US, such as perspectives on ter-
rorism et cetera. I do not mean to suggest that this is necessarily negative, but history has 
shown that this kind of naturalised geopolitics can be highly powerful. 
6.5 The Standing of the SVI in the Public Diplomacy Culture  
The controversy of the genre and the acceptance of the message highlight some of the 
boundaries of the ‘public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era’ (PDWTE) order of discourse. 
I will argue that the advertising situated genre marks a boundary between politicized and 
marketized public diplomacy discourses, and the message marks a boundary between politi-
cized and securitized discourses.  
 
Genre Message 
Politicized Marketized Politicized Securitized 
Karen Hughes Charlotte Beers SD DoD 
Figure 6.2: The Accept and Rejection of the Genre and Message  
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Because the advertising genre traditionally has belonged to the discourse of the market, its 
introduction in the public diplomacy discourse marks a change in the traditionally govern-
mental discourse. However, the advertising genre has not taken hold in the SD public diplo-
macy discourse. The genre is in a political context heavily associated with propaganda and 
has since Charlotte Beers’ era largely been dismissed as a public diplomacy method in the SD 
discourse. Other marketized processes, however, have since then occurred: outsourcing public 
diplomacy tasks from DoD has been officially accepted, and the SD is increasingly encourag-
ing businesses to engage in public diplomacy activities. As discussed in chapter 5, private ac-
tors have fewer restrictions on available methods for public diplomacy and strategic commu-
nication. It is thus not the marketization of public diplomacy as such that has encountered 
such controversy, but rather the governmental fingerprints on propagandistic methods.  
 The SVI campaign is an effort to engage in dialogue with Muslims about the nature of 
the relationship between Americans and Muslims. It can be seen as an expression of the poli-
ticized discourse’s attempt to turn back the “clash of civilisations” discourse, as discussed in 
chapter 5, although it does not specifically refer to that notion. The fact that the notion is not 
used, however, does not mean that its geopolitical representation cannot be present. A typical 
feature of popular geopolitics is the tendency to depoliticise geopolitical discourses by simpli-
fying the message and covering its motivation. However, the campaign’s rather apparent mes-
sage that Americans and Muslims exist in peaceful co-existence witnesses the same motiva-
tion: to split up potential tensions between the groups and attract the audience with soft 
power. This motivation situates the campaign in the politicized discourse about public diplo-
macy and demonstrates its potential conflict with the securitized discourse. The securitized 
discourse rests on a geopolitical representation of a security threat that requires a correspond-
ing representation of an enemy, while the soft power approach aims to deconstruct this idea.  
 Although the campaign was made in the earlier days of the war on terrorism era, much 
of the development of the State Department approach to public diplomacy is well exemplified 
with the SVI and its reputation. Concerning the method of the campaign, the advertising genre 
has not only been outmoded, it has been actively rejected. The message, however, has simul-
taneously been carried on and blurred by a different practice. On the one hand, the soft power 
discourse of alliances remained central in Karen Hughes’ public diplomacy principles (en-
gagement, exchanges, education and empowerment), dialogic ideal and projects such as out-
reach tours and the Rapid Response Unit. On the other hand, the process of coordinating in-
formation practices with the DoD witnesses a securitization process of public diplomacy.  
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Because the coordination process of American public diplomacy is still occurring and 
the role of DoD still immature, the development is at this moment hard to predict. However, 
the outcome of coordinating such contradictory approaches is an interesting starting point for 
future studies of American public diplomacy. 
7  CONCLUSIONS  
 
The subject of this thesis is the geopolitical rationale of American public diplomacy in the 
war on terrorism era. A ‘geopolitical rationale’ is a theoretical concept that refers to spatial-
political networks of power embedded in reasoning and practices. As the thesis shows, 
American public diplomacy is not a uniform concept, but has developed through competing 
geopolitical discourses, and this observation explains some of the confusion concerning its 
purpose and practice. The discourses represent diverging, and often contradictory, public di-
plomacy practices in the war on terrorism. I have labelled these discourses securitized, mar-
ketized and politicized in accordance with how they construe the geopolitical threat, which 
again determines what considerations should be taken into account for countering it.  
In this thesis, I have analysed the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy in the war 
on terrorism era (PDWTE) through three aspects, which I will summarise in this chapter. The 
first aspect concerns what geopolitical representations form the premises of this order of dis-
course. The second aspect relates to how the geopolitical representations manifest in public 
diplomacy efforts, through designation of appropriate institutions and choice of means and 
messages. The third aspect explains the changes and contradictions of public diplomacy prac-
tices in the war on terrorism era, or the output of the discursive struggle. The objects of analy-
sis have been a discursive struggle, comprising ideas and practices of public diplomacy in the 
war on terrorism era, and a case, the public diplomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative. 
Crudely, the analysis of the discursive struggle can be summarised as follows: 
 
 1. aspect: representation 
of anti-Americanism  
2. aspect: manifestation 3. aspect: output 
Politicized Soft power threat Counter clash, attractive 
means 
Securitized Security (Existential) threat Clash, any means 
Marketized Economic threat Private sector involve-
ment, marketing means  
Contradictory 
means and mes-
sages, Discursive 
change, 
Shifting of tasks 
Figure 7.1: Summary of the discursive struggle  
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To explain the geopolitical rationale of the different approaches, it is useful to start with the 
first aspect, their discursive premises. Each discourse advocates public diplomacy as a re-
sponse to the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism. The idea of anti-Americanism is essen-
tially geopolitical because it represents a power structure by which the US in one way or an-
other is threatened by the outside world. Although the term as such remains unchallenged, the 
implication of the threat is construed differently by each discourse. In the politicized dis-
course, anti-Americanism is regarded as a threat to American soft power, in the securitized 
discourse it is regarded as a (potentially existential) threat to American security, and in the 
marketized discourse, it represents an undefined threat to American competitiveness and trade 
security. The perceived implication of anti-Americanism situates the threat in a game of 
power, which shapes the guidelines, or “rules”, for public diplomacy as a means to counter it. 
The rules of the securitized, politicized and marketized discourses are respectively structured 
around ‘security’, ‘soft power’ and ‘economic’ rationales. In a securitized discourse, the 
emergency element calls for short-term measures, with little consideration for other potential 
costs. In the politicized discourse, the threat of anti-Americanism involves a threat to Ameri-
can influence on all levels of the three-dimensional chess game of world politics – military, 
economic and transnational issues – to the extent that they depend on soft power. A particular 
concern in the war on terrorism is that the declining soft power contributes to an increasing 
popular support of Islamist terrorism. The consideration for soft power makes the issue highly 
complex and the rules for public diplomacy rather intricate: Any action must take the poten-
tial loss of soft power into account, in the long term as well as the short. These rules, based on 
the perception of the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism, are closely linked to the second 
aspect of the geopolitical rationale: the designation of institutions to perform public diplo-
macy and choice of appropriate methods and messages.  
Chief institutions involved in public diplomacy activities in the war on terrorism era 
are the State Department (SD) and the Department of Defense (DoD). As I have shown in this 
thesis, the DoD mainly builds its public diplomacy practices on a securitized discourse, while 
the SD practices have elements from politicized, securitized and marketized discourses. The 
rules of these discourses have been analysed through the reaction on their practices from pub-
lic diplomacy circles, which is often based on the reaction from external critics or the target 
audience, and whether the reaction has resulted in a change of practice.  
Concerning the choice of appropriate methods for public diplomacy, there is a conflict 
between the politicized discourse, which requires the use of uncontroversial means, and the 
other discourses, which have fewer restrictions. Two examples have been discussed: the prac-
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tice of covering the source of public diplomacy/information operations, and the use of propa-
ganda. Both practices have caused a heated debate about the practice of the respective institu-
tions: in the SD following the Shared Values Initiative (SVI) and in DoD following the prac-
tice of paying for media coverage through Lincoln Group. However, the subsequent reactions 
witnessed a difference in the public diplomacy discourses between these institutions: While 
the SD marked a distance from the practice of covering sources, the DoD concluded that it 
was within its mandate. Both examples reflect the rules of the respective discourses and their 
institutional manifestation. The controversy in the SD witnesses the impact of the politicized 
discourse, whose purpose of public diplomacy is to counteract the geopolitical threat of losing 
soft power. The acceptance of the DoD practice, on the other hand, indicates the impact of the 
securitized discourse: the geopolitical threat is considered urgent enough to tolerate practices 
that are negatively perceived in public diplomacy circles and among the target audience.  
 Concerning which messages are considered appropriate, the clash of the practices is 
more obvious and its impact on public diplomacy is more substantial. How the geopolitical 
threat of anti-Americanism is defined in a public diplomacy discourse also affects which mes-
sages are being used to encounter it. The respective ‘security’ and ‘soft power’ imperatives in 
securitizing and politicizing discourses connote fundamentally different representations of the 
geopolitical ‘Other’, the anti-American. Exchanges of these representations inevitably clash: 
the geopolitical representation of a security threat requires a corresponding representation of 
an enemy, while the soft power approach aims to build bridges. The discussed SVI campaign 
and the idea of “clash of civilisations” that the politicised discourse aims to counter are good 
examples of this dilemma. This representation is particularly present in the war on terrorism, 
which is often associated with the idea of a civilizational conflict. In contrast, the politicized 
discourse particularly fears the equation of terrorists and Muslims because it enlarges the 
group that could potentially identify themselves as terrorists. Public diplomacy is, according 
to this approach, designated to target the demand-side of terrorism, which is ordinary people’s 
inclination to sympathize with terrorist groups in an alliance against the US. Public diplomacy 
officials associated with the SD actively try to challenge the representation of a conflict or 
clash of civilisations.  
 The SVI campaign is an example of the difficulties of engaging in this debate. It is 
based on the politicized discourse’s representation of anti-Americanism as a threat to Ameri-
can soft power, and its message to audiences in Muslim countries is that Americans and Mus-
lims live in peaceful co-existence in the US. The SVI campaign is an effort to engage in dia-
logue with Muslims about the nature of the relationship between Americans and Muslims. 
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The analysis shows that the campaign actively engages in dialogue with an idea perceived as 
dominating in Muslim countries: that Muslims in the US are either assimilated or excluded. In 
response to this idea, the campaign reconstructs the geopolitical identities as representing a 
relation of alliances. The problem with this “counter clash” thesis is that it has contradictory 
elements. On the one hand, it defines the ‘Muslim’ in exclusive distinction to the ‘American’, 
and constructs the relation as one of alliance. On the other hand, the SVI’s maintenance that 
Muslims have some kind of collective guilt for the terrorist attacks on 9/11 suggests the exter-
nal threat as not being an ally with the US. All the attempts to construct the identity of Mus-
lims in the US in a way presumably appealing to Muslims end up with giving the moral supe-
riority to the US. That being said, such a reading of the film spots requires the approach of a 
devil’s advocate. But this warning is necessary in the discursive climate of the war on terror-
ism, where well-intended public diplomacy campaigns easily can be undermined by other ac-
tions, including conflicting public diplomacy practices.  
 Because securitized, politicized and marketized discourses all contribute to the total 
production of public diplomacy, their contradictory means and messages contribute to produc-
ing each other’s discursive context, or Storyrealm, wherein the message is consumed. In that 
sense, the manifestation of the geopolitical rationale is intimately related to the output of the 
discursive struggle. In addition to producing contradictory messages, the output relates to the 
shifting of tasks between institutions and discursive change.   
 In the PDWTE order of discourse, three different processes are occurring simultane-
ously, called securitization, politicization and marketization. Securitization is the most obvi-
ous process. The discursive struggle about the geopolitical situation has manifested in a shift 
of resource allocations and tasks for public diplomacy from the SD to the DoD. Since 9/11, 
the DoD involvement in public diplomacy has developed from merely supporting some of the 
SD initiatives to becoming an independent perpetrator with an institutionalised coordination 
unit. Simultaneously, there has been a steady shift of public diplomacy tasks from the SD to 
the DoD. The SD active contribution to this process witnesses a manifestation of the securi-
tized geopolitical vision of anti-Americanism also in the SD. At the same time, the private 
sector is increasingly encouraged to engage in public diplomacy activities, producing a mar-
ketized discourse. Simultaneously, through the shifting of tasks, the SD discourse has defined 
its approach in negation to the securitized and marketized discourses and cultivated a soft 
power approach to public diplomacy. This double-edged process has caused much confusion 
among outsiders about the purpose of public diplomacy. However, this confusion should be 
recognised, as the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy is inherently contradictory. 
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF INFORMANTS 
 
Public diplomacy perpetrators 
 
Alan Kotok, interview 16 February 2007  
Alan Kotok is a former USIA employee and managing editor of science magazine and the edi-
tor of USIA Alumni Association’s webpage publicdiplomacy.org. 
 
Alberto Fernandez, interview 28 February 2007 
Alberto M. Fernandez was Director for Public Diplomacy for the Bureau of Near Eastern Af-
fairs in the US State Department between July 2005 and June 2007. As a career Foreign Ser-
vice Officer, he served in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2003, and has previously served in 
Jordan, Guatemala, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and the United 
Arab Emirates. He speaks Arabic. 
 
Bruce Gregory, interview 2 March 2007 
Bruce Gregory is director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at The George Washington Uni-
versity. He was a member of the Defense Science Board’s 2004 Study Task Force on Strate-
gic Communication, the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Public Diplomacy, the 
Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, and the Public Diplomacy Council. He has served as 
coordinator on the Department of State's Response to Terrorism Coalition Working Group on 
Public Diplomacy and as the State Department executive secretary on the Defense Science 
Board's 2001 Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination.  
 
Richard Schmierer, interview 1 March 2007  
Richard Schmierer is a State Department Foreign Service Officer. He served at the headquar-
ters of the U.S. Information Agency between 1988 and1992, first as the head of the Middle 
East office of the International Visitor Program, and later in the Agency’s Office of European 
Affairs. Between 2004 and 2005 he served as Embassy Counsellor for Public Affairs in 
Baghdad, Iraq. He joined the staff of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy in Washington 
D.C. in August 2005. 
 
William A. Rugh, interview 26 February 2007 
William A. Rugh was a US Foreign Service Officer 1964-1995, serving in Washington and at 
seven Middle Eastern diplomatic posts including public affairs officer in Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. He is currently an Associate of Georgetown's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, an 
Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, a Trustee of the American University in Cairo, 
and a Board Member at AMIDEAST. Rugh is the author of Arab Mass Media (2004) and 
American Encounters with Arabs (2006).  
 
David Henry and Petter Næss, interview 14 January 2007 
David Henry and Petter Næss work for the American Embassy of Norway. David Henry is a 
Political Economic Officer and covers environment, agriculture, fishery and public outreach. 
Petter Næss has worked at the embassy and the US Information Service for a total of 20 years.   
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Sideline Critics  
 
Barry Zorthian, interview 27 February 2007 
Barry Zorthian is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has worked for Voice of America, for 
the US Information Services and for the private sector with broadcasting. He was also respon-
sible for media relations during the Vietnam War.  
Today, he is a sideline critic of public diplomacy.  
 
John H. Brown, interview 23 February 2007 
John H Brown is a former Foreign Service Officer who resigned his post when the war in Iraq 
was launched, because he feared it would have negative consequences for public diplomacy. 
He currently teaches courses in public diplomacy at Georgetown University and University of 
Southern California, and is an active blogger on the subject. 
 
Principal Critics  
 
Chris Toensing, interview 26 February 2007 
Chris Toensing is the editor of Middle East report by the organisation Middle East Research 
and Information Project (MERIP). He has written critical articles about public diplomacy, 
such as ”Never too soon to say goodbye to HI”. 
 
John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, interview 12 February 2007 
John Stauber is the founder of the non-profit, non-partisan Center for Media & Democracy 
(CMD) and its newsmagazine PR Watch in Madison, Wisconsin. Sheldon Rampton is the re-
search director of CMD. Together, they have written the books Weapons of Mass Deception 
(2003), The best war ever (2006), Toxic sludge is good for you (2004) and Banana Republi-
cans (2004). Their approach to public diplomacy and propaganda is critical analysis and ac-
tivism. 
 
Lauren Miller, interview 12 February 2007 
Lauren Miller worked for the Center for Media and Democracy from 2000-2006 as the editor 
for PR Watch, and wrote a chapter on public diplomacy in Toxic sludge is good for you 
(2004) by Rampton & Stauber. Now she is working for the listener sponsored community ra-
dio WORT in Madison, Wisconsin. 
 
Nancy Snow, telephone interview 8 March 2007  
Nancy Snow is a communications scholar at University of Southern California. She is a pre-
vious USIA employee and has written critical books and articles about public diplomacy, such 
as Propaganda, Inc. (2002) and Information War (2003).  
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APPENDIX II 
Transcript of the Shared Values Initiative televisions spots 
 
This appendix contains a transcription of the SVI television campaign, copied from Fullerton 
and Kendricks’ book Advertising’s War on Terrorism: The Story of the US State Department 
Shared Values Initiative (2006). To view the actual spots, visit http://www.osu-
tulsa.okstate.edu/sharedvalues/.  
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Film Spot 1: Baker 
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Film spot 1: Baker (Continued) 
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Film Spot 1: Baker (Continued) 
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Film Spot 2: Doctor 
 
 116
Film Spot 2: Doctor  (Continued) 
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Film Spot 3: Teacher 
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Film Spot 3: Teacher (Continued) 
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Film Spot 4: Journalist 
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Film Spot 4: Journalist (Continued) 
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Film Spot 5: Fire fighter 
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Film Spot 5: Fire fighter (continued) 
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